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ABSTRACT 
Essays on Hybrid Bundle Pricing. (August 2010) 
Jeffrey Dean Meyer, B.S., Iowa State University; 
M.S., The University of Texas at Arlington 
 Co-Chairs of Advisory Committee: Dr. Venkatesh Shankar 
  Dr. Leonard L. Berry 
 
Increasingly, firms are offering hybrid bundles — products that combine both 
good(s) and service(s). Some hybrid bundles, such as TiVo that combines a DVR and 
recording management are more visible, while some, such as GE‘s Powerplant System 
that includes a nuclear power plant and maintenance/project management are more 
obscure. While pricing strategies for a goods bundle have been well-studied, services 
bundles have been underexplored. Hybrid bundles, which are fundamentally different 
from bundles of goods or services, have received even less attention. In this dissertation, 
three essays offer important insights into different aspects of hybrid bundle pricing and 
provide important managerial implications and guidelines. 
Essay I develops an analytic model of optimal pricing for hybrid bundles by a 
monopolist. My results show that an increase in quality variability of the service is 
generally associated with a higher optimal hybrid bundle price and a lower optimal price 
of the good, but lower overall bundle profit. They also reveal that the optimal price of 
the service (good) in a hybrid bundle is higher (lower) when the good has diminishing 
unit cost and the service has constant unit cost. 
 iv 
Essay II examines the effects of quality variability, independence, and 
complementarity on willingness-to-pay for hybrid bundle components using conjoint 
analysis experiments. The results show that higher quality variability of a service is 
associated with a wider distribution of willingness-to-pay, that independence between 
the good and the service has positive direct- and cross-effects on willingness-to-pay, that 
complementarity between components has a greater positive effect on the willingness-to-
pay for the service than for the good, and that independence and complementarity 
interact to increase willingness-to-pay. 
Essay III develops a general model for the pricing of hybrid bundles offered in a 
competitive setting. I estimate the model using empirical data of a hybrid bundle 
comprising carpet and installation. The results show that the price of the service plays a 
crucial role in the demands of both the good and service and that the service cross-price 
effect on the demand for the good can be substantially higher than the direct-price effect 
of the good on its own demand. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Increasingly, firms are developing and marketing hybrid bundles – products that 
combine both good(s) and service(s). Hybrid bundles are prevalent in both business-to-
consumer (B2C) and business-to-business (B2B) industries. In the B2C space, for 
example, TiVo sells both the digital video recorder (DVR) and the program guide 
service as a hybrid offering. Similarly, in the B2B space, General Electric sells a power 
plant and a maintenance/project management service together in a single offering. Sales 
of such hybrid bundles have risen dramatically over the past 15 years. For example, from 
1995 to 2004, sales of embedded services (i.e., services sold along with durable goods) 
grew nearly 200 percent, and the share of sales in the durable goods sector attributed to 
embedded services rose from 12 percent to 22 percent (Auguste et al. 2006). In addition, 
in many of the global manufacturing companies, services account for about 25 percent of 
total revenues and approximately 46 percent of total profits (Deloitte Research 2006). 
I formally define a hybrid bundle as a single firm‘s offering that combines one or 
more goods and one or more services, creating more customer benefit than if the good 
and service were available separately, consistent with Shankar, Berry, and Dotzel 
(2009). My hybrid bundle definition contains two key criteria. First, the same firm must 
sell the good and the service. This ensures that the firm receives revenues from both the 
good and the service and eliminates simple complementary goods or services that are 
____________ 
This dissertation follows the style of Marketing Science. 
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sold by different parties. Second, when a customer uses the good and service together, 
the combined utility is superadditive. That is, the benefit a customer receives from the 
purchase and/or use of the good and service together is greater than the benefit a 
customer receives from the good and service separately. 
My dissertation comprises three essays that examine multiple facets of hybrid 
bundle pricing, as shown in Figure 1-1. Each essay offers unique and important insights 
into different aspects of hybrid bundle pricing. 
 
Figure 1-1 Facets of Hybrid Bundle Pricing 
 
 
 
Essay I analyzes the effects of key hybrid bundle factors on its pricing in a 
monopolistic setting. Drawing from the bundling literatures in marketing, economics, 
Characteristics/Factors Under Monopoly 
• Quality Variability • Scalability 
• Independence • Complementarity 
 
Essay I: Optimal Pricing Strategies for 
Hybrid Bundles in Monopoly 
Consumer Willingness-to-Pay 
• Quality Variability • Complementarity 
• Independence of Use 
 
Essay II: Hybrid Bundle Pricing Using WTP 
Measures from Conjoint Analysis 
Empirical Analysis 
• Direct-Price Effects 
• Cross-Price Effects 
 
Essay III: An Empirical Analysis of Hybrid 
Bundle Pricing 
 
Hybrid Bundle Pricing 
• Price of the Hybrid Bundle 
• Price of the Service 
• Price of the Good 
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and operations management, I delineate four importance factors that impact pricing of 
hybrid bundles, namely quality variability, scalability, independence, and 
complementarity. My research questions focus on quality variability and scalability. 
First, how does greater variance in the quality of a service relative to that of a good 
affect the monopolist‘s optimal pricing strategies for hybrid bundles? Second, how does 
lower scalability of the service relative to that of the good influence the monopolist‘s 
pricing strategies for hybrid bundles?  
I formulate a model of optimal hybrid bundle pricing by a monopolist, 
incorporating the four important pricing drivers. Using this model, I develop several 
useful and counter-intuitive propositions on optimal prices of the hybrid bundle, the 
good, and the service. My research extends the literatures on bundling in three important 
ways. First, existing literature focuses on the bundling of goods or the bundling of 
services, but not on the bundling of a good and a service together. My research offers 
important insights into the optimal pricing of hybrid bundles. Second, my research is the 
first to provide insights into the effects of the distinctive characteristics of services 
(namely, greater quality variability and lower scalability relative to goods) on optimal 
bundle pricing. Third, my research is the first to analyze the combined effects of quality 
variability and scalability in conjunction with independence and complementarity of the 
good and the service on the joint pricing decisions of these components in the hybrid 
bundle. 
Essay II examines price sensitivity to three of the four pricing drivers explored in 
Essay I using willingness-to-pay measures extracted from choice-based conjoint (CBC) 
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experiments through hierarchical Bayesian methods. In this essay, the research questions 
focus on quality variability, independence, and complementarity. First, how does quality 
variability affect consumer willingness-to-pay? Second, how do independence and 
complementarity affect consumer willingness-to-pay, both individually and together? 
To address these research questions, I complete three CBC studies. In the first 
study, I focus on quality variability. In the second study, I focus on independence and 
complementarity. In the third study, I focus on all three pricing drivers in one 
experimental setting. The results fill important gaps in the extant bundling literature. 
First, because the bundling of goods and services together has been largely ignored, my 
research examines how the inherent differences between goods and services affect 
consumer willingness-to-pay. Second, extant bundling literature focuses on the purchase 
of the bundle, not the usage of the components. That is, whether or not the components 
can be independently purchased. My research explores the concept of independence of 
usage versus independence of purchase, which can have important implications for the 
pricing of the hybrid bundle components. 
Essay III studies the effects of the pricing of hybrid bundle components on the 
demand for the hybrid bundle in a competitive setting. I develop a general framework 
and model to answer important research questions on pricing of hybrid bundles. That is, 
what are the direct- and cross-effects of pricing of the good and service components on 
the demand for these components? Are these effects symmetric? 
Empirical research on bundling is scarce. Drawing from literature in the cross-
category purchasing literature marketing, I develop a general framework of hybrid 
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bundle pricing and demand. The framework is tested using data from a U.S. specialty 
retailer that markets a hybrid bundle comprising carpet (the good) and installation (the 
service). The results suggest that the effects of pricing in a hybrid bundle setting may be 
considerably different then the cross-category pricing effects. 
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CHAPTER II 
OPTIMAL PRICING STRATEGIES FOR HYBRID BUNDLES IN MONOPOLY 
 
2.1  INTRODUCTION 
Increasingly, firms are developing and marketing hybrid bundles—products that 
combine both good(s) and service(s). Hybrid bundles are prevalent in both business-to-
consumer (B2C) and business-to-business (B2B) industries. In the B2C space, for 
example, TiVo sells both the digital video recorder (DVR) and the program guide 
service as a hybrid offering. Similarly, in the B2B space, General Electric sells a power 
plant and a maintenance/project management service together in a single offering. Sales 
of such hybrid bundles have risen dramatically over the past 15 years. For example, from 
1995 to 2004, sales of embedded services (i.e., services that include durable goods) grew 
nearly 200 percent, and the share of sales in the durable goods sector attributed to 
embedded services rose from 12 percent to 22 percent (Auguste et al. 2006). 
I formally define a hybrid bundle as a single firm‘s offering that combines one or 
more goods with one or more services, creating greater customer benefit than if the 
good(s) and service(s) were available separately.
1
 This definition is adapted from a 
definition of a hybrid innovation, which is essentially a hybrid bundle that is new to the 
firm introducing that bundle (Shankar et al. 2009). My hybrid bundle definition contains 
two key criteria. First, the same firm must sell both the good and the service. This 
criterion ensures that the firm receives revenues from both the good and the service. This 
                                                 
1 For expositional ease, I use the terms, customer and consumer, interchangeably throughout the chapter. 
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criterion also eliminates from consideration simple complementary goods or services 
that are sold by different parties. Second, when a customer uses the good and service 
together, the combined utility is superadditive. That is, the benefit a customer receives 
from the purchase and/or use of the good and service together is greater than the benefit 
a customer receives from purchasing and/or using the good and service separately. 
Hybrid bundles are different from bundles of goods or bundles of services in at 
least three important ways. First, from a demand or marketing standpoint, unlike goods, 
most services are people-intensive, so variability in quality, that is differences in 
expected quality among consumers, is typically greater for services than it is for goods. 
Second, from a supply, cost, or operations perspective, because most services‘ delivery 
involves people, services‘ scalability — the ability to sell high volumes at low unit cost 
— is lower than the scalability of goods. Thus, within a hybrid bundle, the levels of 
quality variability and scalability are mixed, whereas within a bundle of pure goods and 
a bundle of pure services, the levels of quality variability and scalability are similar. 
These differences have different pricing implications for hybrid bundles.  Third, hybrid 
bundles are different from traditional bundles in the way the prices are presented to the 
consumer. For hybrid bundles, prices are often provided with separate prices for the 
good and the service. For example, in a hybrid bundle from TiVo, the price of the good 
(TiVo HD DVR) is presented as $299.99, while the price of the service is listed 
separately as $12.99 per month. In contrast, traditional bundles often give a single price 
for the bundle. For example, the price of a service bundle containing cable, Internet, and 
phone may be presented as $147.99 per month, without a breakout of the prices of the 
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components. Therefore, determination of the optimal prices of the components is more 
relevant for hybrid bundles than for traditional bundles.  
The pricing of a hybrid bundle is critical to its success. Consider TiVo‘s hybrid 
bundle that includes the TiVo DVR (the good) and the program guide (the service). 
Throughout its existence, TiVo has used different prices for the service component of 
the bundle in its quest to be successful. The frequent price changes beg the question: Is 
TiVo optimally pricing its hybrid bundles? Another example is Apple TV. Apple TV 
includes a set-top box (the good) that integrates with Apple‘s iTunes (the service). After 
an unsuccessful pricing attempt of Apple TV during its launch, Apple tweaked both the 
good and the service and reintroduced the set-top box at a price 25 percent lower than its 
initial price. Is Apple optimally pricing the set-top box and the iTunes service that is 
used with the set-top box? Like TiVo and Apple TV, many hybrid bundles are initially 
offered in a monopoly setting.  Furthermore, many hybrid bundles such as home alarm 
and home improvement bundles are offered by marketers, who behave like monopolists 
in their local geographical markets. Therefore, it is important to determine the optimal 
pricing strategies for hybrid bundles in a monopoly.
2
  
Despite the importance of pricing of hybrid bundles, little is known about it. The 
bundling literature in marketing has primarily examined bundles of goods, but some of 
this research considers factors relevant to quality variability (a critical dimension in a 
hybrid bundle) and complementarity (e.g., Balachander et al. 2010; Basu and Vitharana 
                                                 
2 Although hybrid bundles are offered in monopoly and competitive contexts, because little is known 
about the pricing of hybrid bundles, a natural place to start is a monopoly setting. I do not have any reason 
a priori to believe my findings will be substantively different if applied in a competitive setting. 
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2009; Ghosh and Balachander 2007; Kopalle et al. 1999; Venkatesh and Chatterjee 
2006; Venkatesh and Kamakura 2003). Basu and Vitharana (2009) examine a 
monopolist‘s bundle pricing when customers have different levels of knowledge about 
the usefulness of the bundle components such that the existence of a greater number of 
high-knowledge customers exhibits greater variability in reservation price—which is 
closely related to quality variability. They show that higher component prices are 
generally more profitable when there is greater variability in reservation price among 
consumers. Balachander et al. (2010) show that by offering a discount on the bundle, a 
firm can retain customers with low reservation prices, increasing the proportion of 
customers served and profits. Venkatesh and Kamakura (2003) consider optimal bundle 
pricing of goods under a monopoly and show that complementary components should 
typically be priced higher than independently valued components. 
The bundling-related literature in operations management (e.g., Bala and Carr 
2009; Bitran and Ferrer 2007; Rabinovitch et al. 2008) has also not examined hybrid 
bundles but addressed component cost that is germane to scalability (another key 
dimension in a hybrid bundle). Bitran and Ferrer (2007) propose an efficient solution 
procedure to determine the optimal composition and price of a hi-tech goods bundle and 
show that more attractive, lower cost bundles dominate less attractive, higher cost 
bundles. Bala and Carr (2009) analyze pricing of software in a context similar to 
bundling, in which the firm can offer just the upgrade (pure component) or the new 
upgraded software (bundle) at different levels of cost and upgrade quality.  They show 
that a pure component pricing strategy is optimal when upgrade quality is either low or 
10 
 
high, but not in between. Rabinovich et al. (2008) assess the roles of cost mark-up and 
service quality in a retail setting where a good (e.g., CD) is offered with retail service. 
They find that higher service quality is associated with higher price mark-up.  
However, research in both marketing and operations management has not 
explicitly addressed the pricing of a combination of goods and services. Importantly, the 
effects of differential quality variability and scalability across goods and services on 
optimal hybrid bundle pricing have not been explored. These effects have important 
implications for pricing the good, the service and the hybrid bundle. 
To address these gaps in bundling research in marketing and operations 
management, I examine two main research questions. First, how does greater variance in 
the quality of a service relative to that of a good affect the monopolist‘s optimal pricing 
strategies for hybrid bundles? Second, how does lower scalability of the service relative 
to that of the good influence the monopolist‘s pricing strategies for hybrid bundles?  
 My research extends the literatures on bundling in marketing and operations 
management in three important ways. First, existing literature focuses on the bundling of 
goods or the bundling of services, but not on the bundling of a good and a service 
together. My research offers important insights into the optimal pricing of hybrid 
bundles. Second, my research is the first to provide insights into the effects of the 
distinctive characteristics of services (namely, greater quality variability and lower 
scalability relative to goods) on optimal bundle pricing. Third, it is the first to analyze 
the combined effects of quality variability and scalability in conjunction with 
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independence and complementarity of the good and the service on the joint pricing 
decisions of these components in the hybrid bundle. 
2.2  CONCEPTUAL DEVELOPMENT AND RELATED RESEARCH 
As outlined earlier, because hybrid bundles are unique combinations of services 
and goods, I must account for inherent differences between services and goods. These 
differences are key factors that drive hybrid bundle pricing (Shankar et al. 2009). The 
first main difference is from the demand perspective and is variability in quality. 
Customers‘ expectations of quality of a product influence their evaluation of it prior to 
purchase. Variability in the quality of a service may differ from that for a good. Many 
services are people-intensive and involve human actors in the production of the service. 
Thus, people-intensive services have greater variability in outcome than goods (Berry 
1980; Murray and Schlacter 1990). Customers are aware of this aspect, so across 
customers, the expected quality for people-intensive services may vary widely. In 
contrast, for most goods, the variance around quality and customer expectations of 
quality should be considerably smaller. Figure 2-1a represents this scenario graphically. 
The second major difference is from the operations standpoint and it is 
scalability. A key driver of the cost structure differences between services and goods is 
economies of scale or, more commonly referred to as the scalability of the services and 
goods.
3
 Economies of scale exist when unit production costs decrease as the number of 
units produced increases (Tirole 1988). Many services have lower economies of scale or 
lower scalability than goods (Johnson and Selnes 2004). Digital services, however, are 
                                                 
3 I use the terms scalability and economies of scale interchangeably.  In my context, scalability does not 
refer to the ability to add new goods and/or services to a bundle. 
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exceptions.  They are much more scalable than people-intensive services, and in some 
cases, more scalable than even goods as their marginal costs are close to zero. This 
situation results in very different cost structures for goods and services, both people-
intensive and digital, as shown by the graph of total variable costs in Figure 2-1b. For 
the good in a hybrid bundle, the scalability is achieved in a straightforward manner 
through economies of scale. For the service in a hybrid bundle, however, scalability is 
not so clear cut. For people-intensive services, scalability may be hard to achieve 
because cost savings from serving an additional customer may be very small. 
 
 
Figure 2-1 Differences in Quality Variability and Scalability 
 between Goods and Services 
  
(a) (b) 
 
 
Differences between components on the quality variability and scalability are not 
limited to the hybrid bundle context. However, because of the inherent differences 
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are of increased importance in a hybrid bundle setting. Furthermore, these two 
dimensions have received little attention in extant bundling literature. 
Two other factors, independence and complementarity, can also affect the 
revenue potential and optimal prices for the good, the service, and the hybrid bundle. 
While I include these factors in my model, they are not the focal dimensions in my 
research. I do not offer any formal propositions with respect to these factors but focus on 
quality variability and scalability in conjunction with independence and 
complementarity.  
Independence is the extent to which the good and the service are available and 
can be used independent of each other. This factor is similar to bundling form that can be 
one of three: pure components, pure bundling, and mixed bundling (Stremersch and 
Tellis 2002).  A focal question for prior research on bundling is which of these forms of 
bundling is optimal as it treats the choice of bundling form as a firm decision. However, 
this question is less relevant for hybrid bundles as customers typically decide whether to 
purchase or use the good and the service in a hybrid bundle separately or together. For 
example, in Sears‘ hybrid bundle comprising Sears Craftsman garage door opener (the 
good) and Sears professional installation (the service), the consumer determines the level 
of independence. That is, the consumer chooses either to purchase Sears professional 
installation or can do her own installation. Alternatively, the consumer can assemble a 
garage door opener herself and use Sears‘ professional installation. Thus, both the good 
and the service are independent within this hybrid bundle. 
14 
 
Full independence and mixed bundling are essentially equivalent, as are no 
independence and pure bundling. While independence and bundling form share some 
similarities, as argued earlier, they have important differences as well. First, bundling 
forms focus on only the purchase of the components, not their use. Independence 
considers both purchase and use. Thus, simply being able to purchase the good and 
service within a hybrid bundle separately does not necessarily mean the components are 
independent. Second, while much prior research treats form of bundling as a firm‘s 
decision, my concept of independence allows it to be exogenous to the firm, recognizing 
that consumers often decide whether to use the components independently or together.  
Third, independence allows for asymmetry between the components of the bundle. Thus, 
there can be good-only (service-only) independence in which the service (good) cannot 
be purchased and used separately. Finally, while bundling form is discrete (pure 
components, pure bundling, or mixed bundling), my conceptualization of independence 
allows it to be continuous in nature. That is, the level of independence could vary based 
on the hybrid bundle or even the consumer. For example, a hybrid bundle could consist 
of a good that has full functionality when used with the service, but only partial 
functionality when not used with the service. This example would create a situation 
where the good is somewhere between full independence and no independence. Similar 
to mixed bundling's profitability advantage, I expect profitability to be higher with 
greater independence.    
Complementarity is the degree to which the good and service combination 
increases customer utility of the purchase and/or use. The effect of complementarity of 
15 
 
like components (that is, two goods or two services) of a bundle on its pricing has been 
studied. Tesler (1979) argues that complementarity can be a major reason for bundling 
because it yields a superadditive valuation. Venkatesh and Kamakura (2003) show that 
optimal prices are monotonically increasing in degree of complementarity under both 
pure components and pure bundling conditions. They also find that the optimality of 
mixed bundling depends on the degree of complementarity and the ratio of marginal 
costs to maximum reservation prices. As complementarity increases, mixed bundling 
becomes less attractive and pure bundling becomes more attractive. As relative marginal 
costs increase, the marketer is forced to raise prices. This action makes mixed bundling 
less attractive than pure components under low complementarity and less attractive than 
pure bundling under high complementarity.  
Consider a representative example of hybrid bundle—flooring (the good) and 
installation (the service) from national home improvement stores such as Lowe's and 
Home Depot. In this bundle, the quality variability is likely greater for the service than 
the good because of the people-intensive nature of the installation process. In addition, 
consumers' expectations of quality will also likely be more variable for the service than 
the good because prior to purchase, consumers are generally unfamiliar with the skill 
and attitude of the people who would install the flooring. In contrast, consumers can 
touch and feel the actual quality of the flooring, the good. For the home improvement 
store, the flooring is highly scalable, whereas the installation service is not. The home 
improvement store can only perform a limited number of installations in a given time 
period as the pool of qualified installers is not big.  With respect to independence, 
16 
 
because the flooring can be installed by the user, it is independent of the installation 
service. However, the installation service can be used only if the flooring is also 
purchased, and therefore, it is not independent of the good. Finally, consumers view the 
flooring and its installation service as highly complementary. 
Prior research offers some guidance on pricing of bundles in general. Much work 
focuses on the conditions under which bundling improves profitability of goods bundles 
or services bundles (e.g., Schmalensee 1984; Stigler 1968). Models of bundling argue 
that the profitability of bundling depends on consumer reservation prices and costs. 
From the marketing or demand viewpoint, consumer reservation prices drive the 
profitability of bundling form and the optimal bundle price. Several researchers (McAfee 
et al. 1989; Venkatesh and Kamakura 2003; Venkatesh and Mahajan 1993) find that 
mixed bundling generally has a profitability advantage over pure bundling or pure 
components. However, Ghosh and Balachander (2007) find that generalists can gain by 
offering pure bundles to avoid head-to-head competition with specialists. Kopalle et al. 
(1999) also show that as the scope for marketing expansion decreases, a pure 
components strategy becomes the optimal bundling strategy. Subramaniam and 
Venkatesh (2009) find that pure bundling is best in an auction context when the 
components have strong individual demand. Salinger (1995) concludes that if costs are 
not subadditive, bundling can only be profitable if demand is superadditive (i.e., the 
demand for the bundle is greater than the combined demand of the individual products).  
Balachander et al. (2010) find that bundle discounts increase profits through endogenous 
loyalty because it lowers the reservation prices of switchers for competing products. 
17 
 
From the operations perspective, Bitran and Ferrer (2007) consider costs and 
argue that more attractive, lower cost bundles dominate less attractive, higher cost 
bundles. This finding is consistent with Hanson and Martin (1990), who argue that 
bundling is optimal when costs of components are subadditive (i.e., the cost of 
producing the bundle is lower than the sum of the costs of the individual products). Bala 
and Carr (2009) analyze a software upgrade or new bundle decision context for different 
levels of cost and upgrade quality and show that that a pure component pricing strategy 
is optimal at extreme levels of upgrade quality (low or high). On the service quality 
front, Rabinovich et al. (2008) find high quality service allows a marketer to charge 
higher prices for the good. 
While the analytical models of bundling in marketing and operations do not 
address hybrid bundles, an empirical analysis by Bharadwaj and Ter Hofstede (2006) of 
pricing in the context of services that augment goods provides some related insights. 
Their findings show that reducing the price of services encourages customers to spend 
those savings on the good and that customers purchase more goods if they spend more 
on services. They further show that service margin affects the purchase of the good more 
than the opposite, and that customers who spend more on the service are more sensitive 
to the price of the good. However, this study did not examine the optimal pricing of the 
good and the service within a bundle. 
A summary of relevant related research on the pricing of bundles listed in 
chronological order appears in Table 2-1. Taken together, prior bundling research in 
marketing and operations management shows that reservation prices, costs and  
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complementarity affect bundling form as well as optimal bundle pricing. Although each 
study makes an important contribution to the bundle pricing literature, none addresses a 
hybrid bundle. Quality variability and scalability, the unique dimensions of a hybrid 
bundle's optimal pricing, are not addressed by the bundling literature.  In the hybrid 
bundle context, I expect quality variability and scalability, together with independence 
and complementarity, to affect optimal pricing.  
2.3  MODEL 
 To address the research questions, I develop an analytic model that is based on 
three distinct segments in a market of size N: (1) consumers who buy the hybrid bundle 
(size NHB); (2) consumers who buy only the good (size NG); and (3) consumers who buy 
only the service (size NS).
4
 The sizes of the three customer segments depend on a variety 
of factors, including: the prices of the hybrid bundle, service, and good,            ; 
the reservation prices for the good and service for consumer i,    
    
  , which are a 
function of their quality levels;
5
 the degree of complementarity for consumer i,     ; the 
independence of the good and service; and the number of potential consumers in the 
market,    . 
In traditional bundling, a single reservation price is assumed for consumer i for 
the bundle    
  . Consistent with Venkatesh and Kamakura (2003), the degree of 
                                                 
4 A fourth segment, consumers that buy nothing, also exists. Its size is simply             . 
5 Reservation prices can be shown to be a linear function of quality expectations. Let consumer i‘s utility 
be              , where Qi is quality expected by the consumer. Consumer i purchases if    
      >0. In terms of reservation price, consumer i purchases if (     )>0. By equating the 
probabilities of purchase from these two perspectives, it can be shown that                    , 
where    is a linear multiplier. Without loss of generality, assume     . Then         , making Ri a 
linear function of   . Therefore, as quality expectations widen, so does the distribution of reservation 
prices across consumers. 
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complementarity affects the bundle reservation price. Hybrid bundles are different from 
traditional bundles with regard to how the price is presented. Thus, consumer i will have 
a reservation price for the good given that the service will be purchased/used and a 
reservation price for the service given that good will be purchased/used      
      
  . The 
degree of complementarity for consumer i is given by 
    
       
        
      
    
  
  
    
   (2.1) 
From this expression, the combined reservation prices of consumer i for the hybrid 
bundle is given by 
      
      
           
    
    (2.2) 
 As stated earlier, the consumer has a reservation price for each component, the 
good and the service. The consumers‘ reservation prices will, in part, be determined by 
the quality expectations of the good and the service. To model this difference, I use the 
distribution of reservation prices. I argue that the distribution of reservation prices for 
people-intensive services has a wider variance than the distribution of reservation prices 
for goods or digital services. 
 In the traditional bundling literature, costs are often assumed to be linear (i.e., 
constant unit cost) and the same for each item in the bundle (e.g., Venkatesh and 
Chatterjee 2006; Venkatesh and Kamakura 2003). The assumption of equality of 
component costs is more realistic in a goods bundle or a services bundle than in a hybrid 
bundle. However, as described earlier, the cost structures of goods and services are quite 
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different, and an equality of component costs assumption may not be appropriate for a 
hybrid bundle due to differences in scalability of goods and services. 
Returning to the three segments that purchase, I can now define the size of each 
segment for each independence condition. For example, under full independence, 
consumer i purchases the hybrid bundle if she gets a positive surplus from the hybrid 
bundle and if the surplus derived from purchasing the hybrid bundle is greater than the 
surplus generated from buying the good only or the service only. At the aggregate level, 
the sales of the hybrid bundle segment are given in Equation 2.3. 
          
                 
                       
                      
  (2.3) 
In the segment of consumers purchasing only the good (service),       , a consumer i 
purchases the good (service) if the surplus from purchasing the good (service) is positive 
and is greater than the surplus from purchasing the service (good) or the hybrid bundle. 
In this case, the sales of the good and service are given by Equations 2.4 and 2.5, 
respectively. 
         
                  
                      
  (2.4) 
         
                  
                      
  (2.5) 
The monopolist sets the optimal price of the hybrid bundle, the good, and the service to 
maximize profits using the following objective function. 
    
       
   
                   
                      
  (2.6) 
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where NHB, NG, and NS are as defined in Equations 2.3, 2.4, and 2.5 and Π represents 
profits. 
 The same procedure can be done for each independence condition. Knowing the 
size of each segment, I can define the objective function for each independence 
condition. The size of each segment and the objective function for each independence 
condition are shown in Table 2-2. I drop the superscript for consumer i for expositional 
clarity. For the first three independence conditions in Table 2-2, within each       , the 
first term guarantees that the individual participation (IP) constraint is met, while the  
 
Table 2-2 Segment Size and Objective Function for Each Independence Condition 
1. FULL INDEPENDENCE (i.e., hybrid bundle, good, or service can be purchased/used) 
1.1          
                                        
                      
  
1.2                                                   
1.3                                                   
1.4    
       
 Π                                              
2. GOOD-ONLY INDEPENDENCE (i.e., hybrid bundle or good can be purchased/used) 
2.1                                                   
2.2                                       
2.3    
     
 Π                                     
3. SERVICE-ONLY INDEPENDENCE (i.e., hybrid bundle or service can be purchased/used) 
3.1                                                   
3.2                                       
3.3    
     
 Π                                     
4. NO INDEPENDENCE (i.e., only hybrid bundle can be purchased/used) 
4.1                               
4.2    
   
 Π                              
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second and third terms guarantee incentive compatibility (IC). In the objective functions 
found in Table 2-2, the costs for the good and the service are left as generic functions of  
the size the various segments. As described earlier, complementarity affects the size of 
each segment through the reservation prices for the good and the service within a hybrid 
bundle. For simplicity, and consistent with past research (e.g., Venkatesh and Kamakura 
2003), I assume that the degree of complementarity is the same for all consumers. 
 Figure 2-2 shows a graphical depiction of the basic framework for each 
independence condition. For this illustration, the reservation prices,        , are drawn 
from the joint uniform distribution such that             for          , where 
  represents the maximum reservation price. Thus, the service and good have the same 
quality variability. Complementarity is also restricted, such that      . A 
complementarity value of less than zero would represent substitutability, which is not 
relevant to hybrid bundles. A complementarity value equal to zero represents no 
complementarity, which while contrary to my definition of a hybrid bundle, is an apt 
representation of very low complementarity. A complementarity value of greater than 
one becomes unrealistic. The simplest condition is the no independence condition (2-2a). 
Here, the monopolist can only serve one segment, and the size of that segment is 
determined by the price of the hybrid bundle and the degree of complementarity between 
the good and the service. With good-only independence (2-2b) or service-only 
independence (2-2c), the monopolist can serve two segments. The size of the segments 
are determined by the price of the hybrid bundle, the price of the good (or service), and 
the degree of complementarity between the good and service. Finally, under full  
25 
 
Figure 2-2 Graphical Depictions of Reservation Price Regions for Good, Service and 
 Hybrid Bundle Purchases under Different Levels of Independence 
  
(a) No Independence (b) Good-only Independence 
  
(c) Service-only Independence (d) Full Independence 
Legend 
 
Buy hybrid 
bundle  
Buy only 
good  
Buy only 
service  
No purchase 
 
 
independence (2-2d), the monopolist can serve all three purchasing segments. Here, the  
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sizes of the segments are determined by all three prices (hybrid bundle, good, and 
service) and the degree of complementarity between the good and service. 
 This framework offers closed-form solutions under certain conditions. As 
mentioned earlier, full independence, good-only independence, and service-only 
independence are forms of mixed bundling. While prior research does not provide any 
closed-form solutions for mixed bundling, I can derive closed-form solutions for the no 
independence condition, where the monopolist only sells the hybrid bundle, serving only 
the     segment. The size of the segment depends on a number of factors and, as shown 
in Figure 2-3, can be represented in three distinct ways. To allow for differences in 
quality variability for the service and good, I draw reservation prices,        , from the 
joint uniform distribution such that                   for        and 
        , where δ represents the quality variability differential between the 
 
Figure 2-3 Graphical Depictions of Closed-Form Solutions for 
 Hybrid Bundle Pricing under No Independence 
   
(a)       (b)           (c)       
 Note:       
   
  ,            =  
Region of reservation prices of consumers who buy the hybrid bundle 
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service and the good. Thus, the service and good have the same quality variability when 
   , while the good has less quality variability than the service when    . The size 
of the segment served is given by Equation 4.1 in Table 2-2. Assuming a constant unit 
cost function for both the good and the service, the monopolist‘s problem can be defined 
as in Equation 2.7. 
     
   
                    (2.7) 
Solving for    , I find (see Appendix 1 for a derivation): 
 
   
  
 
 
 
              
 
         
                    
              
 
 
 
 
     
     
   
 
       
       
                         
      
 
 
     
   
 
       
       
                             
     
   
 
      
 
  (2.8) 
 Broadly speaking, the three conditions that produce optimal prices can be viewed 
as low costs, medium costs, and high costs conditions. When    , the middle costs 
condition disappears and the low and high costs conditions are equal to those found in 
Venkatesh and Kamakura (2003). Consistent with Venkatesh and Kamakura (2003), the 
optimal price of the hybrid bundle is increasing in complementarity and costs of the 
good and/or service. I can also examine the effects of changes in the quality variability 
of the good using  . Interestingly, the middle costs condition is not affected by  . When 
   , the quality variability of the good is lower than the quality variability of the 
service. For both the low and high costs conditions, the optimal price of the hybrid 
bundle is lower when    . 
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 Aside from the no independence case, the monopolist‘s objective function does 
not lend itself to closed-form solutions in other cases, which represent a form of mixed 
bundling. Consistent with previous research on mixed bundling (Adams and Yellen 
1976; Kopalle et al. 1999; Schmalensee 1984; Venkatesh and Chatterjee 2006; 
Venkatesh and Kamakura 2003), I adopt a numerical method to solve for the optimal 
good and service prices. For each scenario involving service quality variability, 
scalability, complementarity, and independence, I follow the method of Venkatesh and 
Chatterjee (2006) by creating 40,401 synthetic consumers in a two-dimensional, 
       , grid representing consumer reservation prices. Each consumer in the grid has 
a unique combination of good and service valuations,        , ranging from       to 
      based on the particular joint beta distribution used for that scenario. 
 I capture the differences in quality variability between goods and services by 
drawing consumers‘ reservations prices from a joint beta distribution. While past 
research has often used a joint uniform distribution (e.g., Venkatesh and Chatterjee 
2006; Venkatesh and Kamakura 2003), I require a distribution that allows me to 
manipulate the variance in reservation prices, while keeping the mean reservation price 
the same for the good and the service. The joint beta distribution fits this need nicely. 
Moreover, the uniform distribution is a special case of the beta distribution, so past 
research results can be nested within my research results. Higher service quality 
variability, and thus expectations in quality, can be reflected in two cases. First, the 
quality variability for the service can increase relative to a base case of equal good and 
service quality variability. To explore this situation, I consider an equal quality 
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variability condition, where quality variability for the good and the service follow a beta 
           distribution, while I examine an unequal quality variability condition in 
which the good follows a beta        distribution and the service follows a beta 
           distribution. Second, the quality variability for the good can decrease relative 
to a base case of equal good and service quality variability. To explore this situation, I 
consider an equal quality variability condition with the good and service following a 
       distribution, while I investigate an unequal quality variability condition similar to 
the first case. Figure 2-4 provides a visual representation of these three conditions. 
 
Figure 2-4 Distributions of Reservation Prices of the Good and Service under 
 Equal and Unequal Quality Variability Conditions 
 
 
(a) Equal low quality 
variability of good and 
service  
 
 
(b) Low quality variability of 
good and high quality 
variability of service  
 
 
(c) Equal high quality 
variability of good and 
service  
 
 
 To operationalize the different degrees of scalability for the good and the service 
that lead to the different cost structures, I consider two different conditions. The first 
condition, equal scalability, is where both the good and the service have equal, constant 
variable costs of               for goods and               for services. The 
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second condition, unequal scalability, is where the good enjoys economies of scale while 
the service does not. Here, I assume that the good‘s total variable costs follow an 
exponential distribution function, while the service‘s unit costs are constant as before. 
 Along with the quality variability and scalability conditions, I also take into 
account the four independence conditions mentioned earlier (i.e., full independence, 
good-only independence, service-only independence, and no independence). Thus, based 
on different levels of service scalability, quality variability, and independence, there are 
         scenarios to consider. For each of these scenarios, complementarity 
ranges from 0 to 1 in steps of 0.1, creating 11 complementarity conditions for each 
scenario. Therefore, I consider           different scenarios. 
 To determine the optimal prices and profits for each scenario, I use a grid search 
procedure. Within each scenario, I vary the appropriate prices of the hybrid bundle, the 
good, and the service,    ,    and   , over the feasible range in increments of 0.001. For 
each combination of prices, I determine if synthetic consumer   purchases the hybrid 
bundle (under all independence conditions), only the good (under full independence and 
good-only independence), only the service (under full independence and service-only 
independence), or does not purchase at all. With this set up, I determine the size of each 
segment served for the given independence condition by summing across all 40,401 
synthetic consumers. I substitute these segment sizes into the appropriate objective 
function from Table 2-2 to calculate the profit under the specific service scalability and 
independence conditions for each scenario. I then identify the prices for which the 
profits are maximized. 
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2.4  PROPOSITIONS ON OPTIMAL PRICES, PROPORTION OF BUYERS,  
 AND PROFIT 
 In this section, I derive a series of propositions on the optimal prices and profits 
associated with hybrid bundles. I focus on the effects of quality variability and 
scalability on the optimal prices, proportion of buyers, and profits across the various 
levels of independence and complementarity. 
2.4.1 Demand Side Effects: The Effects of Quality Variability of Good and Service 
 
 Proposition 1: Compared to a base case of equal quality variability for the good 
 and the service, 
  
a. an increase (a decrease) in quality variability for the service (good) is 
associated with a higher (lower) optimal price for the hybrid bundle; 
b. an increase (a decrease) in quality variability for the service (good) is 
associated with a lower optimal price for the good; 
c. an increase (a decrease) in quality variability for the service (good) is 
(generally) associated with a higher optimal price for the service;  
d.  an increase (a decrease) in quality variability for the service (good) is 
associated with lower (higher) optimal proportion of buyers; and 
e. an increase (a decrease) in quality variability for the service (good) is 
associated with lower (higher) optimal profit. 
 
 From the demand standpoint, higher service quality variability can be reflected 
by two cases. First, the quality variability for the service can increase relative to a base 
case of equal quality variability for the good and service. To explain what happens in 
this case, consider Figure 2-5. The curve in 2-5a represents the distribution of service 
reservation prices under low service quality variability, while the curves in 2-5b and 
2-5c represent the distribution of reservation prices under high service quality 
variability. Under low service quality variability (2-5a), suppose that for the given 
conditions, the optimal service price is 0.60. At this price, the firm maximizes profits 
while serving approximately 32 percent of the customer base. Now, suppose that service 
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quality variability increases. In the high quality variability condition, with a service price 
of 0.60, the firm would now serve approximately 37 percent of the customer base 
(Figure 2-5b). However, this is not the profit-maximizing optimal service price for the 
high quality variability condition. In this case, the firm should increase the service price 
such that it can extract higher margins from serving fewer customers with higher 
reservation prices than in the case of low quality variability. That is, higher quality 
variability means there is greater customer heterogeneity, so the firm can raise prices. 
This result is shown in 2-5c, where the optimal service price is higher than in 2-5a under 
lower service quality variability. Generally, fewer customers served at higher margins 
result in lower overall firm profits. 
 
Figure 2-5 Distributions of Service Quality for Different Levels of Variability 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(a) low quality variability (b) high quality variability (c) high quality variability 
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variability for the good and service. In this case, the opposite result occurs. The firm 
lowers the price, serving more customers at lower margins to maximize profits, which 
are higher. 
 With respect to the optimal hybrid bundle price (Proposition 1a), opposite effects 
occur depending on whether the service has an increase in quality variability or the good 
has a decrease in quality variability. When the quality variability for the service 
increases, it is optimal for the firm to have higher hybrid bundle prices. However, when 
the quality variability for the good decreases, it is optimal for the firm to have lower 
hybrid bundle prices. The intuition for the difference is as follows. With an increase in 
quality variability for the service, the reservation price for the service is more variable. 
Because the hybrid bundle reservation price is the sum of the good and service 
reservation prices (multiplied by a complementarity factor), it also is more variable. 
Therefore, more consumers are located at the high and low ends of the distribution of 
reservation prices for the hybrid bundle. Under these conditions, the firm prices the 
hybrid bundle higher to maximize profit from the greater customer heterogeneity. The 
opposite occurs with a decrease in quality variability for the good. The distribution of 
reservation prices for the hybrid bundle is more clustered around the mean, and the firm 
lowers the hybrid bundle price to attract more customers around the mean and maximize 
profit. Figure 2-6a shows the effects of changes in quality variability for the 
service/good on the optimal hybrid bundle price through a representative example. These 
effects occur across all independence and complementarity conditions. 
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 Regarding the optimal price for the good (Proposition 1b), it is optimal for the 
firm to decrease the price of the good both when the quality variability of the service 
increases and when the quality variability of the good decreases. This result can be 
explained by the following reasoning. An increase in service quality variability is 
associated with higher hybrid bundle prices (Proposition 1a). When this outcome occurs, 
the firm is faced with fewer consumers purchasing the hybrid bundle. However, some of 
these consumers who no longer purchase the hybrid bundle, adequately value the good 
alone. To capture some of these consumers and recoup some of the losses when the good 
is available separately (i.e., full independence and good-only independence), it is optimal 
for the firm to lower prices for the good. A decrease in quality variability for the good 
has a more direct effect on the optimal price for the good when it is available separately. 
Here, more consumers are clustered around the center of the distribution due to the lower 
customer heterogeneity. This situation allows the firm to lower the price of the good to 
capture a greater proportion of customers without sacrificing margin much. Figure 2-6b 
shows a representative example. As mentioned, these effects occur under full 
independence and good-only independence and across all complementarity conditions. 
Prices for the good are less important under service-only independence and no 
independence than under the full independence and good-only independence conditions. 
 With respect to the optimal price for the service (Proposition 1c), it is generally 
optimal for the firm to increase the price of the service both when the quality variability 
of the service increases and when the quality variability of the good decreases. The 
intuition behind this proposition is as follows. With an increase in quality variability for 
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the service, the reservation price for the service is more variable. Therefore, more 
consumers are located at the high and low ends of the distribution of reservation prices 
for the service. Under these conditions, the firm prices the service higher to maximize  
 
Figure 2-6 Effects of Changes in Quality Variability of the Good and Service on 
 Optimal Prices and Overall Firm Profits 
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profit from the greater customer heterogeneity. With a decrease in quality variability for 
the good, I know from Proposition 1a that the optimal price for the hybrid bundle 
decreases. When this happens, some consumers that previously only valued the service 
sufficiently for purchase now purchase the hybrid bundle. The remaining consumers 
who only adequately value the service for purchase have even higher reservation prices 
for the service than the previous set of service-only consumers, and it is optimal for the 
firm to raise the price of the service to take advantage of this. Consider Ecolab, a leading 
provider of cleaning supplies and service to restaurants. Because its restaurant customers 
are more heterogeneous in size, type of cuisine and style of dining in large metros than 
in small towns, their expectations of service quality also vary considerably more in 
metros than in small towns. Consistent with this proposition, Ecolab charges higher 
prices for its services in larger cities than in smaller towns. Figure 2-6c shows a 
representative example. As mentioned, these effects occur under full independence and 
service-only independence and across all complementarity conditions. Prices for the 
service are less important under good-only independence and no independence than 
under the full independence and service-only independence conditions.  
 With regard to the proportion of buyers and overall firm profit (Propositions 1d 
and 1e), opposite effects occur depending on whether the service has an increase in 
quality variability or the good has a decrease in quality variability. When the quality 
variability for the service increases, fewer customers purchase and the firm has lower 
profits. However, when the quality variability for the good decreases, more customers 
purchase and the firm has a higher profit.  I can explain this result for each of the four 
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independence conditions. Under full independence, an increase in quality variability for 
the service causes more consumers to be located at the high and low ends of the 
distribution of reservation prices for the hybrid bundle and the service. Therefore, the 
firm raises prices on the hybrid bundle and service to serve fewer customers at a higher 
margin but a lower profit compared to when the quality variability of the service was 
lower. At the same time, the firm lowers prices on the good to capture more of the good-
only customers, serving more customers at a lower margin but a higher profit. The 
decrease in consumers purchasing the hybrid bundle and the service only overshadows 
the increase in consumers purchasing the good only. The end result of serving fewer 
consumers is lower profit. The opposite occurs win a decrease in quality variability of 
the good. More consumers purchasing the hybrid bundle and good-only due to lower 
prices overshadow the fewer consumers purchasing the service. The end result of serving 
more consumers is higher profit. 
 Under good-only independence, a decrease in quality variability for the good 
decreases both the hybrid bundle price and the price of the good. The lower prices attract 
customers with lower reservation prices and lead to a higher profit. An increase in 
service quality variability increases hybrid bundle prices, but decreases the price of the 
good. However, the net effect is fewer customers purchasing and lower profit. 
 Under service-only independence, an increase in service quality variability 
increases both the hybrid bundle price and the service price. The higher prices dissuade 
customers with lower reservation prices from purchasing and contribute to a lower 
profit. A decrease in quality variability for the good decreases hybrid bundle prices and 
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generally increases the price of the service. The increase in consumers purchasing the 
hybrid bundle overshadows the decrease in consumers purchasing only the service, 
yielding a higher profit. 
 Finally, under no independence, only the hybrid bundle can be purchased. An 
increase in quality variability for the service raises hybrid bundle prices, attracting fewer 
consumers and resulting in lower profit. A decrease in quality variability for the good 
lowers hybrid bundle prices, attracting more consumers and resulting in higher profit. 
Figure 2-6d shows a representative example for profit. 
2.4.2 Supply Side Effects: The Effects of Scalability of Good and Service 
 
Proposition 2: Compared to a base case of constant and equal unit cost for the 
good and the service, when the good has diminishing costs and 
the service has constant unit cost, 
 
a. optimal hybrid bundle price is lower; 
b. optimal price of the service (good) is higher (lower);  
c. optimal proportion of buyers is higher; and 
d. optimal profit is higher. 
 
 From the supply perspective, I represent the scalability of the service relative to 
the good using two different cost function conditions. The first condition assumes that 
both the good and the service have equal, constant unit costs. The second condition 
assumes that the good has diminishing unit costs and the service has constant unit costs 
as before.  
 Optimal hybrid bundle prices are lower when the good has diminishing unit costs 
than when it has constant unit costs (Proposition 2a). The intuition for this proposition is 
as follows. Because the hybrid bundle costs are additive in the component costs, the 
lower costs for the good directly lower the cost of the hybrid bundle. By lowering the 
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price of the good, the firm can increase demand and serve more customers at similar 
margins. Figure 2-7a shows a representative example. These effects occur under all 
independence and complementarity conditions. 
 With respect to optimal prices for the good and service (Proposition 2b), 
diminishing unit costs for the good compared to constant unit costs for the good has 
opposite effects for the good and service. While the optimal price of the good decreases 
in this situation, the optimal price of the service increases. This proposition‘s intuition is 
as follows. For the good, the diminishing unit costs of the good have a direct effect of 
lowering the optimal price for the good because the firm leverages the lower costs by 
lowering prices to capture more of the good-only market under the full independence 
and good-only independence conditions. For the service, the diminishing unit costs of 
the good have a more indirect effect of increasing the optimal price for the service. 
Service prices are only optimized under the full independence and service-only 
independence conditions. As shown in Proposition 2a, diminishing unit costs for the 
good lowers the optimal hybrid bundle price. A lower hybrid bundle price induces some 
consumers who previously only purchased the service to now purchase the hybrid 
bundle. The service valuations of the remaining consumers who buy only the service are 
higher than those of the consumers who bought only the service prior to the decrease in 
the hybrid bundle price. Thus, by increasing the price of the service to serve these 
remaining service-only customers, the firm can obtain a higher margin. TiVo‘s pricing 
change in 2006 validates this proposition.  During this period, even as TiVo‘s DVR price 
dropped due to improved scalability offered by technological advance, TiVo raised the  
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price of its subscription service. Figures 2-7b shows representative examples for the 
good and the service. 
 
Figure 2-7 Effects of Changes in Scalability of the Good on Optimal Prices,  
  Proportion of Buyers, and Overall Firm Profits 
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 With respect to the proportion of buyers and overall firm profits (Proposition 2c 
and 2d), when the good has diminishing unit costs compared to constant unit costs, both 
the proportion of buyers and overall firm profit is higher. Again, I can provide the 
intuition for each independence condition. Under full independence, the lower costs for 
the good lead to lower hybrid bundle prices, lower prices for the good, and higher prices 
for the service. Thus, I have more customers purchasing the hybrid bundle and the good, 
but fewer purchasing the service, although at a higher margin. The increase in the 
number of consumers purchasing the hybrid bundle and the good only eclipses the 
decrease in the number of consumers purchasing the service, resulting in higher overall 
profits. 
 Under good-only independence, the lower costs for the good lead to lower hybrid 
bundle prices and lower prices for the good. This situation leads directly to more 
consumers purchasing and higher firm profit. 
 Under service-only independence, the lower costs for the good lead to lower 
hybrid bundle prices, but higher prices for the service. Thus, I have more consumers 
purchasing the hybrid bundle, but fewer consumers purchasing the service, although at a 
higher margin. The number of consumers being added to the hybrid bundle segment is 
greater than the number leaving the service-only segment. The net effect is a higher 
proportion of buyers and higher firm profit. 
 Lastly, under no independence, the lower costs for the good lead to lower hybrid 
bundle prices. Thus, there are more consumers purchasing the hybrid bundle and higher 
firm profit. Figure 2-7c shows a representative example for profit and proportion buying. 
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2.4.3 The Effects of Independence and Complementarity 
 Although I offer no formal propositions on the effects of independence and 
complementarity on optimal prices and profit, I briefly discuss them. I find that the 
optimal hybrid bundle price and profit are highest under full independence and lowest 
under no independence. The results in the full independence condition are consistent 
with those in mixed bundling form. Similarly, the results in the no independence are 
consistent with those in pure bundling form. That is, ceteris paribus, full independence 
has a profitability advantage over no independence. However, decreasing the quality 
variability for either the good or the service can remove the profitability advantage. That 
is, no independence with low quality variability can be more profitable than full 
independence with high quality variability. Low quality variability allows the firm to 
lower prices, increase demand and serve a greater proportion of the market. Furthermore, 
I find that optimal prices for the hybrid bundle, the good, and the service, along with 
profits, increase with complementarity. Interestingly, at the highest levels of 
complementarity, I find that the effects of independence are greatly diminished. 
2.4.4 Results Summary and Contributions Relative to Literature 
 A summary of the key results from the propositions appears in Table 2-3. The 
key results relate to the effects of quality variability and scalability on optimal prices and 
profits. When quality variability is higher for the service than for the good, the optimal 
hybrid bundle and/or service price is higher. Although the bundle and service-only 
buyers have higher margins, they are not able to offset the loss in revenue from the 
overall lower proportion of buyers, resulting in lower profits. The greater scalability of 
43 
 
the good over the service, however, allows for a lower optimal price for the hybrid 
bundle and/or the good, but a higher service price. In this case, the monopolist serves a 
higher proportion of buyers at approximately equal or higher margins, with a net effect 
of higher profits.  
 
Table 2-3 Summary of Key Analytical Results on Hybrid Bundle Pricing 
Conditions 
Optimal Prices Proportion 
of Buyers 
and Profit 
Hybrid 
Bundle Service Good 
QUALITY VARIABILITY 
 
Quality variability of 
service increases 
Higher Higher Lower Lower 
 
Quality variability of 
good decreases 
Lower Higher* Lower Higher 
SCALABILITY 
 
From equal, constant unit 
costs for the good and the 
service to diminishing 
unit costs for the good 
Lower Higher Lower Higher 
* Generally true except for a few extreme values of quality variability of the good in some simulation 
scenarios. This relationship is always true for low complementarity between the good and the service. 
However, for high levels of complementarity, the optimal price of the service does not always increase in 
some conditions. However, these situations are rare and inconsequential as with higher levels of 
complementarity, very few customers purchase the service alone, so the focus is on the price of the hybrid 
bundle. 
 
 
 My results extend findings from the bundle pricing literature in marketing (e.g., 
Ghosh and Balachander 2007; Kopalle et al. 1999; Venkatesh and Chatterjee 2006; 
Venkatesh and Kamakura 2003) in many ways. First, to my knowledge, my research is 
the first to examine the effects of different levels of quality variability of the components 
within a bundle. Because of the inherent differences between a good and a service, 
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differences in quality variability between the components in a bundle are more likely in 
a hybrid bundle than in a goods-only or a services-only bundle. Consumers are aware of 
this variability and form their expectations accordingly prior to purchase. My findings 
suggest that typically when quality variability of the service is greater than that for the 
good, counter-intuitively, the optimal hybrid bundle price is higher, but overall profit is 
lower.  
 Second, my results also expand on the bundling-related research in operations 
management. While some prior studies have included costs in their analysis (e.g., Bala 
and Carr 2009; Bitran and Ferrer 2007), they assume costs to be the same for all the 
components in a bundle, so they do not consider different levels of scalability between 
the components.  My findings show that the higher scalability of the good over the 
service in a bundle leads to lower optimal prices of the good and the hybrid bundle, but 
higher optimal price for the service and a greater overall profit. 
 Third, although not a primary focus of my research, my results on independence 
and complementarity reinforce and extend prior bundling research (e.g., Balachander et 
al. 2010; Venkatesh and Kamakura 2003). Full independence of the components within a 
bundle yields optimal profit similar to mixed bundling generally having a profitability 
advantage. Similarly, consistent with prior bundling research, I find that price and profit 
increase with complementarity. I extend prior research by showing that at the highest 
levels of complementarity, the level of independence has little effect as the optimal 
prices and profits converge as consumers naturally want to purchase and use the 
45 
 
components of the hybrid bundle together. I also show that low quality variability is 
more critical than independence from a profitability standpoint. 
2.5  DISCUSSION AND MANAGERIAL IMPLICATIONS 
I now discuss the answers to the two main research questions and outline their 
managerial implications. The focus in the first research question was the difference in 
quality variability between goods and services. My findings on optimal prices on this 
dimension are counter-intuitive. Compared to a base case of equal quality variability for 
the good and service, the findings suggest that a profit-maximizing monopolist should 
increase the price of the hybrid bundle and the price of the service as service quality 
variability increases. However, while this strategy is optimal, an increase in service 
quality variability leads to fewer consumers purchasing and lower overall firm profit 
than that when service quality variability is low. Similarly, optimal prices for the hybrid 
bundle and good decrease with a decrease in quality variability of the good, leading to 
more consumers purchasing and a higher overall firm profit. Therefore, managers should 
carefully consider the differences in quality variability for the good and the service 
within a hybrid bundle. For hybrid bundles that include people-intensive services, 
service quality has a wider variation than the quality of the good, leading to a wider 
distribution of reservation prices for the service than the good. To account for this 
situation, managers should consider pricing the service and the hybrid bundle relatively 
higher, while pricing the good relatively lower. 
Managers must also be mindful about how quality variability affects profits. 
While higher service quality variability is associated with higher optimal prices for the 
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hybrid bundle and the service, firm profit is lower. Therefore, executives may want to 
lower service quality variability as higher optimal price of the service and the bundle is 
counter-productive to overall firm profit. Although quality variability is exogenous in 
the model, over a long period of time, firms do try to influence it. Thus, over the years, 
fast food restaurants such as McDonald‘s, which offer food (the good) and service, have 
been able to reduce quality variability in service by following standardized practices 
(e.g., consistent method of greeting, order-taking, cleaning, fulfilling orders across 
customers).  The lowered variability in the quality of service and the good has enabled 
such restaurants lower the bundle price, attract more customers, and boost overall profit. 
In the second research question, the focus was on the scalability of the service 
relative to the good. Consistent with my expectation, I find that, ceteris paribus, the 
optimal prices for the hybrid bundle and the good are lower when the good has 
diminishing costs than when it has constant costs. The optimal price for the service, 
however, is less straightforward. My results suggest that, ceteris paribus, the optimal 
price for the service is higher when the good has diminishing costs than when it has 
constant costs.  
In setting hybrid bundle prices, managers must take into account the interaction 
between scalability and independence of the good and the service within a hybrid 
bundle. When the service is less scalable than the good and when the service is available 
independent of the good, managers should consider pricing the service higher to 
maximize profits. Increased scalability of the good generally leads to relatively lower 
prices for the hybrid bundle and the good. Managers can thus increase the price of the 
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service to extract a higher margin on the service-only customers without sacrificing the 
total number of customers served. For example, suppose an outdoor spa hot tub 
marketer, who is a monopolist in a local market, offers a hybrid bundle of a spa hot tub 
and lifetime maintenance service, but also sells the hot tub and maintenance service 
separately. Suppose this marketer has developed a highly scalable manufacturing process 
for hot tubs. In this case, the more scalable component (hot tub) should lead to lower 
prices for both the hybrid bundle and the hot tub. When this outcome occurs, more 
consumers will purchase the hybrid bundle or the hot tub. This situation allows the 
manufacturer to increase the price of the maintenance-only service contracts without 
sacrificing overall profit. While the marketer may be serving fewer maintenance-only 
customers, in doing so, it derives a higher margin.  
2.6 LIMITATIONS AND EXTENSIONS 
 My research is a first attempt at developing a pricing model for hybrid bundles. 
Naturally, it has limitations, offering opportunities for future research. The limitations in 
my research relate mostly to the assumptions I made for parsimony and tractability of 
simulations. First, I assume that the degree of complementarity between the good and the 
service in a hybrid bundle is the same for all consumers. Future research could relax this 
assumption by allowing complementarity to vary by consumer. For example, in addition 
to the good and service reservation prices following a beta distribution, one could allow 
the complementarity to also follow a beta distribution. 
Second, in my simulations, I assume that independence between the good and 
service is dichotomous, creating four independence conditions. However, independence 
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could be continuous or be a consumer level parameter. For example, for some hybrid 
bundles, technologically savvy consumers may be able to use a good (service) more 
independently from the service (good) than consumers who are not technologically 
savvy.  
Third, I explored scalability by varying the cost structure of the good. I did not 
explore the possibility of highly-scalable digital services. In addition, I only considered 
two different cost conditions to keep the number of simulations reasonable. Future 
research could explore highly-scalable digital services as well as look at the effects 
under different levels of good and service marginal costs. 
Fourth, my research focus is limited to a monopoly. This setting is realistic for 
many new-to-the-market hybrid bundles and is a useful start in the analysis of all hybrid 
bundles. The analysis could be extended to duopoly and other competitive settings for 
greater generalizability and extend bundling research in competitive contexts (e.g., Chen 
1997; Ghosh and Balachander 2007). 
Finally, my research looks at a single time period. Many hybrid bundles involve 
a single purchase of a good with a subscription-based service. Over multiple time 
periods, the good may be replaced and prices of the subscription-based service may 
change. A model that allows for multiple time periods would also provide more valuable 
insights. 
2.7 CONCLUSION 
Hybrid bundles are and will continue to be a vehicle of growth for traditional 
goods firms and conventional service companies in both B2C and B2B industries. In this 
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essay, I conceptually outlined how hybrid bundles differ from traditional bundles of 
goods or bundles of services and how these differences have implications for bundle 
pricing. I formulated a model of optimal hybrid bundle pricing by a monopolist and 
developed several useful and counter-intuitive propositions on optimal prices of the 
bundle, the good and the service under varying conditions of quality variability and 
scalability, while also accounting for independence and complementarity of the 
components. My results show that an increase (decrease) in quality variability for the 
service (good) is generally associated with higher (lower) optimal prices for the hybrid 
bundle and lower optimal price for the good, but lower (higher) overall firm profits. 
They also reveal that the optimal service (good) price in a hybrid bundle is higher 
(lower) when the good has a diminishing unit cost and the service has a constant unit 
cost (i.e., the good is more scalable than the service).  
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CHAPTER III 
HYBRID BUNDLE PRICING USING WILLINGNESS-TO-PAY 
MEASURES FROM CONJOINT ANALYSIS 
 
3.1  INTRODUCTION 
 Many traditional manufacturing companies and traditional service companies are 
increasingly selling hybrid bundles—bundles comprising one or more goods and one or 
more services. By some estimates, sales of embedded services (i.e., services sold along 
with durable goods) grew nearly 200 percent from 1995 to 2004, and the share of sales 
in the durable goods sector attributed to embedded services rose from 12 percent to 22 
percent in the same period (Auguste et al. 2006). In addition, in many of the global 
manufacturing companies, services account for about 25 percent of total revenues and 
approximately 46 percent of total profits (Deloitte Research 2006).  
The pricing of such hybrid bundles is critical to the success and profitability of 
firms selling these bundles. In particular, three factors, quality variability, independence, 
and complementarity are important determinants of pricing (Meyer and Shankar 2010). 
While some theoretical insights about the effects of these factors on pricing are known, 
empirical or experimental evidence on their effects is sparse. In particular, little is known 
about the effects of these three important factors on consumer willingness-to-pay for the 
hybrid bundle and its components. This research aims to fill this void by estimating these 
effects using consumers‘ willingness-to-pay measures extracted in an experimental 
setting. 
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Consider the hybrid bundle of flooring (the good) and installation (the service) 
offered by Lowe‘s, a home improvement retailer. While the good is tangible and is 
homogenous in quality, the service is intangible and considerable heterogeneity exists in 
the quality of the installation. How does this difference in quality variability between the 
good and the service affect consumers‘ willingness-to-pay for the installation? As 
another example, consider U-Haul‘s hybrid bundle consisting of the sale of a truck hitch 
and the rental of a pull-behind trailer. Are consumers willing to pay more for the hitch 
because it can be used with a multitude of trailers instead of only with U-Haul‘s trailers? 
Similarly, would consumers be willing to pay less for the pull-behind trailer rental if it 
could only be used with a U-Haul hitch? Finally, consider TiVo‘s hybrid bundle offering 
of the digital video recorder (DVR) and program guide service. Does the increased 
benefit consumers receive from using the DVR with the program guide service increase 
their willingness-to-pay for the DVR? These are the other types of questions that this 
research will help answer. 
The bundling literature has a long history in marketing and economics. 
Unfortunately, the bulk of this literature focuses on the bundling of similar components; 
that is, a bundle consisting only of goods or a bundle consisting only of services. The 
bundling of goods and services has been largely ignored. There are inherent differences 
between goods and services that suggest that consumer willingness-to-pay for hybrid 
bundles and the pricing of such bundles may be inherently different from those for 
bundles with similar components. This research helps fill this important gap. 
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Similarly, the bundling literature has often focused on the purchase of bundle 
components, not on their usage. The changes in consumer utility when components are 
purchased together differ from those when the components are used together. TiVo‘s 
DVR and program guide are often purchased together and must be used together. 
However, an Otis elevator and Otis‘ maintenance service need not be purchased together 
nor used together as an Otis elevator can be serviced by a third party, and Otis services 
competitive elevator brands. These differences have significant implications for the 
willingness-to-pay for hybrid bundles and the purpose of this research is to examine 
these differences as well. 
The rest of the essay is organized as follows. I start with conceptual development 
and propose several hypotheses, focusing on the topics of bundling, willingness-to-pay, 
quality variability, independence, and complementarity. I follow with three experimental 
studies that examine the effects of quality variability, independence, and 
complementarity on willingness-to-pay both separately and together. I then present and 
discuss the results. I discuss the managerial implications and close by highlighting the 
key limitations and future research avenues. 
3.2  CONCEPTUAL DEVELOPMENT AND HYPOTHESES 
A hybrid bundle is a single firm‘s offering that combines one or more goods with 
one or more services, creating greater customer benefit than if the good(s) and service(s) 
were available separately. This definition is consistent with the definition in Meyer and 
Shankar (2010). This hybrid bundle definition contains two key criteria. First, the same 
firm must sell both the good and the service, ensuring that the firm receives revenues 
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from both. Second, when a customer uses the good and service together, the benefit a 
customer receives from the use of the good and service together is greater than the 
benefit a customer receives from using the good and service separately. 
3.2.1  Bundling 
Stremersch and Tellis (2002, p. 55) define bundling as ―the sale of two or more 
separate products in a package.‖ When a firm decides to bundle products or services 
together, it must choose its strategy along two dimensions: bundle focus and bundle 
form (Stremersch and Tellis 2002). The bundle focus decision reduces to a decision 
between product bundling and price bundling. Product bundling and price bundling 
differ in two main ways. First, price bundling requires the sale of the bundle at a 
discount compared to the sum of the individual components, whereas product bundling 
does not. Second, product bundling requires integration among the components of the 
bundle, whereas price bundling does not. Put into the context of hybrid bundles, which 
requires that the use of the service and good together increase consumer benefit, hybrid 
bundles are product bundles and not price bundles. 
The bundle form decision reduces to a decision about how the components of the 
bundle are offered to consumers. If the components are only offered in a bundle, the 
bundle form is called pure bundling. If the components are not offered in a bundle at all, 
the bundle form is called pure components. However, if the components are offered both 
in a bundle and separately, the bundle form is called mixed bundling. In hybrid bundles, 
bundle form is deemphasized in favor of independence. Independence is the extent to 
which the good and service are available and can be used separately from each other 
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(Shankar, Berry, and Dotzel 2009). Important differences exist between independence 
and bundling form. First, bundling form is focused on the purchase of the components, 
but not necessarily on the use. That is, in pure bundling, a consumer may still be able to 
use the components separately. However, in hybrid bundles with no independence, not 
only may the consumer not be able to purchase the components separately, the consumer 
will not be able to use one of the components without the other. Another important 
difference is the discrete nature of bundle form: pure components or pure bundling or 
mixed bundling. Contrary to this conceptualization, independence is more continuous in 
nature and can vary based on the components of the hybrid bundle or vary by consumer. 
Consider a Sirius satellite radio. Without the Sirius service, the radio may have partial 
functionality in that it can play land-based radio stations, whereas with the Sirius service, 
the radio has full functionality. 
Bundling research has a long history in economics and marketing. The extant 
research can be placed in two major buckets.  The first bucket typically uses normative 
models to provide guidance on the optimal pricing and/or design of bundles on a variety 
of topics. For example, bundling can be used as a price discrimination tool to extract 
greater consumer surplus (e.g., Adams and Yellen 1976; Schmalensee 1984; Venkatesh 
and Mahajan 1993). Complementarity increases consumer reservation prices for the 
bundle versus the sum of the individual components (e.g., Tesler 1979; Venkatesh and 
Kamakura 2003). Increased profitability due to bundling can come from component cost 
sub-additivity (e.g., Hanson and Martin 1990). Mixed bundling, pure bundling, and pure 
components all have areas of optimality depending on factors such as cost and demand 
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(e.g., Adams and Yellen 1976; Schmalensee 1984; Venkatesh and Kamakura 2003).  
Bundling can reduce competition through tie-in sales and by deterring entry (e.g., 
Carbajo, De Meza, and Siedman 1990). 
The second bucket is more behavioral in nature and explores consumers‘ 
perceptions of bundling on a variety of topics.  For example, consumers form subjective 
evaluations for each component within a bundle, which are then combined to form an 
overall evaluation (Gaeth et al. 1990). The authors use a tie-in context where the tie-in 
has a much lower monetary value than the primary product and find that the tie-in can 
have an effect on bundle attractiveness equally as high as the primary product, even 
though the monetary value is much lower.  Bundling also induces consumers to purchase 
more than if the products were offered individually (Drumwright 1992). Building on 
Thaler‘s (1985) transaction utility, Yadav and Monroe (1993) find that consumer‘s 
transaction value is largely influenced by the additional savings offered by purchasing 
the bundle; however, savings on individual items are also important.  When consumers 
evaluate bundles, they start with an anchor of the most important attribute and make 
adjustments throughout the evaluation (Yadav 1994).  With respect to bundle evaluation 
and pricing, a discount on the more preferred bundle component results in a higher 
bundle evaluation (Yadav 1995). In terms of complementarity, the greater the functional 
complementarity between components of a bundle, the greater the likelihood of 
purchasing the bundle (Herrmann, Huber, and Coutler 1999). 
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3.2.2  Willingness-to-Pay 
 The value of a product offering has been called ―the cornerstone of marketing 
strategy‖ (Anderson, Jain, and Chintagunta 1993, p. 3). Therefore, it is not surprising 
that willingness-to-pay and reservation price
6
 have received much attention in marketing 
and economics. However, as pointed out by Wang, Venkatesh, and Chatterjee (2007), 
there is inconsistency in the literature with respect to the definition. Extant literature has 
considered: (1) the minimum price at which a consumer will no longer purchase (Hauser 
and Urban 1996); (2) the price at which a consumer is indifferent between purchasing 
and not purchasing (Moorthy, Ratchford, and Talukdar 1997); and (3) the maximum 
price at which a consumer will purchase (Varian 1992). Jedidi and Jagpal (2009) call 
these the ceiling reservation price, indifference reservation price, and floor reservation 
price, respectively.  I define willingness-to-pay as the indifference reservation price; that 
is, the price at which a consumer is indifferent between purchasing and not purchasing a 
product. I treat a consumer‘s willingness-to-pay as a monetary measure of a product‘s 
utility. At the consumer‘s willingness-to-pay price, the surplus extracted for the 
consumer is the same with or without purchase — zero. 
Estimating consumers‘ willingness-to-pay can be done using data from one of 
five sources: market or purchase data; laboratory or field experiments; experimental 
auctions; direct surveys; and indirect surveys. Each method has its own advantages and 
disadvantages.  For example, observational methods using market or purchase data are 
not subject to hypothetical bias and are incentive compatible because they are based on 
                                                 
6 In this chapter, I use the terms willingness-to-pay and reservation price interchangeably. 
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actual purchases.  However, such methods are limited in the number of price points that 
can be studied (Jedidi and Jagpal 2009). While laboratory or field experiments allow for 
additional control, they are typically associated with higher costs. Experimental auctions, 
such as the Vickrey (1961) and the Becker, DeGroot, and Marshak (1964) procedure, are 
incentive compatible using real money, but lack realism with the purchase situation. 
Direct surveys elicit consumers‘ self-stated willingness-to-pay and are the easiest to 
implement, but perhaps are the most likely to lead to inaccurate results due to consumers 
increased likelihood to overstate willingness-to-pay for more well-known brands and 
understate for less well-known brands (Jedidi and Jagpal 2009). Indirect surveys cover 
the many varieties of conjoint analysis, including choice-based conjoint analysis.  
Conjoint analysis has a long history in marketing and is discussed in more detail later in 
this essay. 
3.2.3  Quality Variability 
 Hybrid bundles are unique combinations of services and goods. The common 
differences of services compared to goods — intangibility, perishability, heterogeneity, 
and simultaneous production and consumption — are well documented (e.g., Zeithaml, 
Parasuraman, and Berry 1985). While each of these differences likely affects a 
consumer‘s willingness-to-pay, one of particular importance to the pricing of hybrid 
bundles is heterogeneity.  Zeithaml, Parasuraman, and Berry (1985, p. 34) sum up the 
fundamental nature of heterogeneity in services as follows. 
The quality and essence of a service … can vary from producer to producer, from 
customer to customer, and from day to day. Heterogeneity in service output is a 
particular problem for labor intensive services. 
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A key part of this description of heterogeneity of services is the variability in quality. 
Whereas the production of goods is often standardized and quality control is tightly 
contained, the production or performance of a service often lacks standardization and 
tightly constrained quality control, especially for labor-intensive services. Even prior to 
purchasing, consumers expect services to have greater variability in quality than goods 
(Murray and Schlacter 1990). However, it is unknown how this will affect consumers‘ 
willingness-to-pay for services, either in a bundle or stand-alone services. 
 In a normative model on hybrid bundle pricing, Meyer and Shankar (2010) 
assume that greater quality variability is associated with a wider distribution of 
reservation prices across consumers. Using this association, the authors find that the 
optimal price for the service in a hybrid bundle increases with an increase in quality 
variability of the service. However, the assumption of the association between greater 
quality variability and a wider distribution of reservation prices is not tested. This leads 
to the following hypothesis. 
H1: When the quality variability of the service is high versus low, the 
 variance of consumers‘ willingness-to-pay for the service is wider. 
 
No formal hypotheses are made regarding the effect of the quality variability of the 
service on the average willingness-to-pay for the service or the average and distribution 
of the willingness-to-pay for the good.  However, no significant differences in any of 
these three measures are expected. 
3.2.4  Independence 
 As mentioned previously, bundle form is deemphasized in hybrid bundles in 
favor of independence, which is the extent to which the good and service can be used 
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separately from each other (Shankar, Berry, and Dotzel 2009). Therefore, many of the 
findings in extant literature with respect to the optimality of mixed bundling over pure 
bundling or pure components are not entirely instructive with respect to independence. 
However, the ability to use the good or the service separate from the other component in 
the hybrid bundle should increase the consumer‘s utility. An increase in utility should be 
reflected with a higher willingness-to-pay. Anecdotal evidence suggests that businesses 
may be pricing information goods to reflect this. Take Amazon.com, which offers e-
books in two formats: a propriety format that can only be used with the Kindle (or 
compatible hardware running Kindle software) and a portable document format that can 
be used on a wide variety of hardware. A quick browsing of the books at Amazon.com 
that are available in both formats routinely shows that the more independent format is 
higher priced than the less independent format. This leads to the second hypothesis. 
H2a: When the service is independent from the good, consumers are 
 willing to pay more for the service. 
 
H2b: When the good is independent from the service, consumers are 
 willing to pay more for the good.  
 
 Independence of one component can also have an effect on the willingness-to-
pay for the other component.  For example, if the service is independent, consumers may 
be willing to pay more for the good than if the service is not independent. In essence, 
this is a cross-demand effect. Consumers‘ expertise with products increase as they 
become more familiar with them. The increased familiarity and expertise can lead to 
automaticity, which frees up recourses to be used on other tasks (Alba and Hutchinson 
1987). In a hybrid bundle setting, increased usage of the service (or good) due to its 
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independence from the good (or service) increases the consumer‘s familiarity and, thus, 
expertise with the service (or good). When this occurs, consumers have more resources 
to devote to the usage of the good (or service), increasing their utility and leading to 
higher willingness-to-pay measures. This leads to the third hypothesis. 
H3a: When the service is independent from the good, consumers are willing 
to pay more for the good. 
 
H3b: When the good is independent from the service, consumers are willing 
to pay more for the service.  
 
3.2.5  Complementarity 
Both the normative models and behavioral research streams have looked at 
complementarity. Complementarity is central in the very definition of hybrid bundles. 
Shankar, Berry, and Dotzel (2009, p. 96) define complementarity as ―the degree to 
which the value to the customer increases when the product and the service are used 
together.‖ This is similar to the concept of super-additivity of reservation prices found in 
the normative models research stream (e.g., Venkatesh and Kamakura 2003). By 
definition, the normative models require that willingness-to-pay is higher with increased 
complementarity. Research in the behavioral research stream focuses on whether the 
components of a bundle are functionally related or not functionally related (e.g., 
Herrmann, Huber, and Coutler 1999); that is, complementary or not complementary, 
respectively. Gaeth et al. (1990) show that complementary bundles are evaluated 
differently than non-complementary bundles. Herrmann, Huber, and Coutler (1999) 
show that consumers are more willing to purchase functionally related bundles versus 
bundles not functionally related. However, little research has looked at the effect of 
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complementarity on the willingness-to-pay for components in a bundle. Thus, I 
hypothesize as follows. 
H4: When complementarity between the good and the service is high versus 
low, consumers are willing to pay more for (a) the service and (b) the 
good. 
 
3.2.6  Independence – Complementarity Interaction 
 It is reasonable to believe that independence and complementarity interact to 
significantly alter consumers‘ willingness-to-pay for the good or the service within a 
hybrid bundle. Independence affects whether the consumer can use the good and service 
separately. Complementarity affects whether the consumer wants to use the good and 
service together. Although independence is conceptually different from bundling form, 
extant research in the normative models stream provides some guidance. Venkatesh and 
Kamakura (2003) show that with strong complements, pure bundling can be optimal 
versus mixed bundling or pure components. With strong complementarity, consumers 
are more likely to want to purchase the bundle, and optimal prices increase and converge 
to the pure bundling prices. Similarly, Meyer and Shankar (2010) show that although full 
independence typically has higher optimal prices, the optimal prices converge to the no 
independence prices at the highest levels of complementarity. Based on this, one might 
expect that the difference in consumers‘ willingness-to-pay between independence and 
no independence is significantly smaller with high complementarity versus low 
complementarity. On the other hand, one could argue the effects of independence and 
complementary are multiplicative. That is, the difference in consumers‘ willingness-to-
pay between independence and no independence is significantly larger with high 
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complementarity versus low complementarity. Thus, the fifth and sixth hypotheses do 
not indicate a direction of the interaction. H5 focuses on the direct effects, while H6 
focuses on the cross effects due to familiarity and expertise as in H3. 
H5a: Differences in consumers‘ willingness-to-pay for the service under high 
and low complementarity are moderated by the independence of the 
service from the good. 
 
H5b: Differences in consumers‘ willingness-to-pay for the good under high 
and low complementarity are moderated by the independence of the 
good from the service. 
 
H6a: Differences in consumers‘ willingness-to-pay for the good under high 
and low complementarity are moderated by the independence of the 
service from the good. 
 
H6b: Differences in consumers‘ willingness-to-pay for the service under high 
and low complementarity are moderated by the independence of the 
good from the service. 
 
3.2.7  Conjoint Analysis 
 As alluded to earlier, the studies described below rely on conjoint analysis to 
elicit consumer willingness-to-pay. Conjoint analysis is defined as ―any decompositional 
method that estimates the structure of a consumer's preferences … given his/her overall 
evaluations of a set of alternatives that are prespecified in terms of levels of different 
attributes‖ (Green and Srinivasan 1978, p. 104). Many types of conjoint analysis exist, 
from full profile to self-explicated to adaptive to choice-based to incentive-aligned 
(Ding, Grewal, and Liechty 2005). Common among these methods is the use of multiple 
attributes and levels within attributes to create product profiles. The preferences for all 
or some of these profiles are measured using one of the many conjoint analysis 
techniques. From this, each respondent‘s preference structure is created based on the 
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attributes and levels. For each attribute-level combination, respondents‘ part-worths are 
estimated. A part-worth is a measure of a respondent‘s marginal utility for that attribute 
level. By combining the attributes and levels in different ways to form the different 
profiles, the respondent‘s utility for a given profile can be determined. 
 Conjoint analysis is not without its limitations. For example, it is assumed that 
the part-worths for each respondent are stable throughout the conjoint analysis. 
However, it is possible that within-task learning occurs and respondents‘ preferences 
change as the task continues (Bradlow 2005). Other criticisms relate to the number and 
levels of attributes. Many products have a large number of attributes, but typical conjoint 
tasks only evaluate a small subset of these attributes. Similarly, the attributes and levels 
within the attributes must be the important or salient attributes to provide accurate part-
worth estimates (Bradlow 2005).  
Extracting consumers‘ willingness-to-pay from conjoint analysis began in earnest 
with the ground-breaking work of Kohli and Mahajan (1991). The authors assume a 
status quo product against which consumers compare other concepts. The willingness-to-
pay that is calculated is the ceiling price for a particular concept in which the consumer 
would switch away from the status quo product. Wübker and Mahajan (1999) extend the 
work of Kohli and Mahajan (1991) and estimate willingness-to-pay for product bundles 
where the one non-price attribute is either an individual item (e.g., French fries) or a 
bundle of individual items (e.g., French fries, Big Mac, and drink). This research was 
one of the first forays extracting willingness-to-pay from conjoint analysis in a bundling 
setting. Jedidi and Zhang (2002) also build off of Kohli and Mahajan (1991), but depart 
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from the requirement of a status quo product. This method is the one used in this essay, 
and will be discussed in more detail in a later section. Sichtmann and Stingel (2007) also 
use a status quo product; however, the authors select the status quo product for each 
individual through a limit-conjoint procedure, where the concept with the lowest utility 
that a consumer would actually purchase is set as the status quo product. More recently, 
Sonnier, Ainslie, and Otter (2007) directly specify respondents‘ willingness-to-pay using 
Bayesian analysis. 
3.3  STUDY 1 
 
The first study focuses only on the effects of quality variability on willingness-
to-pay within a hybrid bundle setting, without directly considering either independence 
or complementarity. Thus, it tests H1. 129 undergraduate students at a U.S. university 
participated in a laboratory experiment for class credit. Of the 129 responses, 19 
incomplete responses were discarded, keeping 110 usable responses for final analysis. 
The average respondent age was 20.5 years and 57.3 percent of respondents were 
female. 
3.3.1  Conjoint Design 
Study 1 uses a hybrid bundle comprising a portable multimedia device (the good) 
and a streaming multimedia service (the service) for the conjoint experiment. I selected 
this hybrid bundle based on a pretest (n = 84) in which subject interest and knowledge 
about portable multimedia players (similar to Apple iPod) and streaming or on-line 
multimedia services was high. For simplicity, I limited the hybrid bundle to no 
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independence. That is, the portable music player could not be used without the streaming 
music service, and vice versa. 
Both the good and the service had one non-price attribute and one price attribute. 
Therefore, each hybrid bundle profile consisted of four attributes that were presented to 
the respondents. The portable multimedia device was described as a device that ―plays 
audio and video, such as music and TV shows.‖ For the good, the non-price attribute 
was the weight of the portable multimedia device using two levels: 3 ounces and 10 
ounces. The price attribute for the good comprised three levels ($25, $100, and $175) 
with a sufficiently broad range to cover reasonable prices (Haaijer and Wedel 2007). The 
streaming multimedia service was described as a service that ―sends wireless audio and 
video signals, such as music and TV shows, to a compatible player so you can listen or 
watch.‖ For the service, the non-price attribute was the number of different music 
channels from which the user can choose, again using two levels: 50 channels and 150 
channels. The price attribute for the service also consisted of three levels with a 
sufficiently wide range: $5 per month, $10 per month, and $15 per month. 
To manipulate quality variability, the following scenario was presented to the 
respondents: 
Consumer Reports had nine experts rate the quality of the portable 
multimedia device and the streaming multimedia service. After using the 
combination for one month, the experts rated the quality using a scale 
between 1 and 10, where 1 is Very Low Quality and 10 is Very High Quality. 
 
Under the low (high) service quality condition, respondents were then presented with the 
following: 
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The expert ratings for the streaming multimedia service were consistent 
(inconsistent), with a narrow (wide) range between 6 and 8 (4 and 10). The 
overall average rating was 7. The graph below shows each expert's rating for 
the streaming multimedia service. Each red tick-mark represents an expert's 
rating. 
 
As indicated, the respondents were also presented with a visual scale to reinforce the 
narrow or wide distribution of service quality ratings, as shown in Figure 3-1. 
 
Figure 3-1 Service Quality Variability Manipulation 
(a) Low 
Service 
Quality 
Variability 
 
(b) High 
Service 
Quality 
Variability 
 
 
 
 A choice-based conjoint design was selected and administered using Sawtooth 
Software. Choice-based conjoint designs are often considered to better simulate the 
actual choice decision consumers must make (DeSarbo, Ramaswamy, and Cohen 1995). 
Each respondent was presented with twelve random choice tasks and two fixed choice 
tasks. Each choice task consisted of three choices. The twelve random choice tasks were 
selected using the balanced overlap method instead of minimal overlap. In minimal 
overlap, an attribute level repeats itself within a choice task as little as possible (e.g., a 
portable multimedia music player price of $100 shown in more than one of the three 
concepts). This method attempts to ensure that the choices made contribute information 
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about the value of that attribute (Rao 2008). The balanced overlap method allows level 
overlap within a single choice task, but does not allow for duplicate concepts in a single 
choice task. If concepts with a particular attribute level are always selected by a 
respondent, the choices made will not contribute much information. The balanced 
overlap method is effective by allowing additional overlap to account for these situations 
(Sawtooth Software 2008). 
3.3.2  Estimation of Willingness-to-Pay 
 As mentioned above, willingness-to-pay can be estimated from conjoint analysis 
data in a variety of ways. For this study, I followed the method of Jedidi and Zhang 
(2002). The first step is to obtain the part-worth utilities for each respondent from the 
choice-based conjoint data. Unfortunately, obtaining individual-level estimates is often 
difficult because of the limited number of observations per respondent (DeSarbo, 
Ramaswamy, and Cohen 1995). However, hierarchical Bayesian methods allow for the 
recovery of the individual-level part-worth utilities with such limited observations 
(Allenby, Arora, and Ginter 1995). 
 I implemented the hierarchical Bayesian model using Sawtooth Software (2009). 
The attribute levels are coded using effects coding versus dummy coding. To begin, at 
the higher level, individual part-worths are assumed to follow a multivariate normal 
distribution, 
               
   (3.1) 
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where    is a vector of part-worths for individual i,   is a vector of part-worth means 
across individuals, and   is a matrix of variances and covariances of part-worths across 
individuals. 
 Within each choice task, a respondent chooses one of the concepts. The 
probability of individual i choosing a concept follows a multinomial logit model, 
        
  
         
   
  (3.2) 
Where    is the probability of individual i choosing concept k in a choice task and    is  
a vector of values describing concept j in a choice task, for j from 1 to 3. 
 I used Gibbs sampling and Monte Carlo Markov Chain method to estimate  ,  , 
and   . The estimation process consisted of 40,000 iterations.  Within each iteration, I 
used an adaptive Metropolis Hastings algorithm to draw each new set of   values, 
attempting to keep the acceptance rate near 0.30 (Sawtooth Software 2009). I used the 
first 20,000 iterations for burn-in until the process converges.  I used the next 20,000 
iterations for the actual estimation and obtained the final values of  ,  , and    by 
averaging across the final 20,000 iterations. 
 With the part-worth utilities in hand, I use the method of Jedidi and Zhang (2002) 
to estimate each individual‘s willingness-to-pay. The willingness-to-pay extracted 
through this method is the indifference reservation price, or ―the price at which the 
consumer is indifferent between buying and not buying the product, given the 
consumption alternatives available to the consumer‖ (Jedidi and Zhang (2002, p. 1352). 
Individual i gets some utility for the consumption of product profile   and consumption 
of the composite product   , given by the expression         . If individual i has an 
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income of  , the budget constraint is given by   
        , where   is the price of 
product profile  . Thus, the individual utility function of individual i is given by: 
    
     
    
  
                                  
     
  
  
           
 (3.3) 
Thus, the reservation price,      , is the price at which the following expression holds: 
          
        
  
        
  
  
     . (3.4) 
Using a quasi-linear utility function and a multiattribute utility model, the utility for 
product profile   can be written as: 
                          
 
    (3.5) 
where     is        
   and   is a positive constant,       is the utility from non-price 
attribute k and    is the value of the kth non-price attribute, and      is equal to     
 
 
and   is a positive constant. 
 From equations 3.4 and 3.5, the reservation price for individual i can be 
recovered as follows: 
          
 
   
      
 
    (3.6) 
However, because conjoint analysis, including choice-based conjoint analysis, is often 
performed with indicator variables, the following transformation is required: 
          
  
   
  
   
 
   
  
 
    (3.7) 
With this transformation,       
  can be computed as a dollar-metric exchange rate of 
dollars for utiles. The summation in the second part of equation 3.7 is the sum of the 
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utilities for the non-price attributes at their given levels for product profile  . Thus, the 
willingness-to-pay for individual i is obtained by multiplying the dollar-metric exchange 
rate by the total utility of the non-price attributes. 
 As mentioned earlier, the conjoint design for Study 1 involves a hybrid bundle 
with four attributes: one non-price attribute each for the good and the service and one 
price attribute each for the good and the service. When calculating the willingness-to-
pay for the good (the service), the price attribute for the service (the good) is treated as a 
non-price attribute. For example, when calculating the willingness-to-pay for the service 
in this study, the exchange rate – the first part of equation 3.7 – is calculated using the 
price attribute for the service. The utility of the product profile   – the second part of 
equation 3.7 – is the sum of the part-worths for the number of channels attribute for the 
service, the weight attribute for the good, and the price attribute for the good. I 
calculated the willingness-to-pay for each respondent. 
3.3.3  Results 
 To begin analyzing the results, it is informative to examine the aggregate 
conjoint results for both the low and high service quality variability conditions. These 
results appear in Table 3-1. Within each attribute, for both the low quality variability and 
the high quality variability conditions, the aggregate part-worth utilities are in the 
expected directions. That is, consumers prefer spending less money to more money, 
prefer a lighter good to a heavier good, and prefer more channels for the service to fewer 
channels. Interestingly, the price of the good seems to be more important under a high 
quality variability condition than under a low quality variability condition. 
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Table 3-1 Aggregate Conjoint Results for Study 1 
Hybrid 
Bundle 
Component Attribute Level 
Part-Worth Utilities Average Importance 
Low 
Service 
Quality 
Variability 
High 
Service 
Quality 
Variability 
Low 
Service 
Quality 
Variability 
High 
Service 
Quality 
Variability 
Portable 
Media 
Player 
Price 
$25 0.731 0.810 
30.4 36.7 $100 0.085 –0.082 
$175 –0.816 –0.728 
Weight 
3 ounces 0.320 0.186 
12.6 8.9 
10 ounces –0.320 –0.186 
Streaming 
Multimedia 
Service 
Price 
$5/month 0.890 0.687 
35.0 35.1 $10/month –0.002 0.098 
$15/month –0.888 –0.785 
Channels 
150 0.561 0.406 22.1 19.4 
50 –0.561 –0.406   
 
 
 While the aggregate analysis is an interesting starting point, it does little to shed 
light on the distribution of willingness-to-pay measures for the service under low and 
high service quality variability. To test H1, I use a one-way ANOVA with the Levene 
(1960) test for equality of variances. Figure 3-2 provides an error bar chart for the 
willingness-to-pay for the service under low and high service quality variability 
conditions. The distribution of willingness-to-pay measures for the service is 
considerably wider under the high service quality variability condition than the low 
service quality variability condition. The Levene test for homogeneity of variance 
confirms that the distribution under high service quality variability is significantly wider 
(F1,108 = 23.14; p < .001). Although not a focus, the ANOVA results show a surprisingly 
significant main effect in which the willingness-to-pay for the service is actually higher 
under a high service quality variability condition than in a low service quality variability 
condition (    
               
           F1,108 = 10.42; p = .002). 
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Figure 3-2 Study 1 Error Bar Chart 
 
 
 
3.3.4  Discussion 
 The purpose of Study 1 was to explore H1. That is, when the quality variability 
of the service is higher, does consumers‘ willingness-to-pay have a wider variance for 
the service? As hypothesized, the distribution of consumers‘ willingness-to-pay is 
significantly wider under high service quality variability than under low service quality 
variability. To my knowledge, this research is the first to examine the effects of service 
quality variability on willingness-to-pay for a service, whether the service is part of a 
hybrid bundle or not. The intuition behind this finding is as follows. When a service has 
a wider distribution of quality, but the same mean quality, this means an individual 
consumer is more likely to get both a high and a low quality service than when the 
distribution of quality is narrow. Some consumers will be willing to pay more on the 
chance they will get the high quality service, while some consumers will be willing to 
73 
 
pay less on the chance they will get the low quality service. This initial finding has 
important implications for academic research and marketing practice. 
 The finding offers valuable insights into an important factor that can affect the 
pricing of hybrid bundles and services. Because quality variability has been largely 
ignored in the normative models research stream for bundle pricing, it is important that 
future research include this factor when researching hybrid bundles or traditional 
bundles whose components differ in quality variability. Managerially, this finding can 
help provide guidance in the pricing of high quality variability services within a hybrid 
bundle. The wider distribution of reservation prices for high quality variability services 
means there is greater customer heterogeneity in pricing of the service than that of the 
good. This finding suggests that managers may actually have greater latitude in pricing 
the high quality variability components within a hybrid bundle. Indeed, a higher price for 
the service with high quality variability can actually be more profitable (Meyer and 
Shankar 2010). 
3.4  STUDY 2 
The second study focuses on the effects of independence and complementarity on 
willingness-to-pay within a hybrid bundle setting. Thus, it tests H2a, H3a, H4, H5a, and 
H6a. To help test these hypotheses, 91 undergraduate students at a U.S. university 
participated in a laboratory experiment for class credit. Of the 91 responses, eight 
incomplete responses were discarded, resulting in 83 responses for final analysis. The 
average respondent age was 20.9 years and 52.4 percent of respondents were female. 
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3.4.1  Conjoint Design 
Study 2 uses a hybrid bundle containing a digital video recorder (the good) and 
an online music service (the service) for the conjoint experiment. I chose this hybrid 
bundle based on a pretest (n = 84) of subject interest and knowledge about DVRs and 
online music services.  
Both the good and the service had two non-price attributes and one price 
attribute. Therefore, each hybrid bundle profile consisted of six attributes that were 
presented to the respondents. The DVR was described as a device that ―records 
television in a digital format to an internal disk drive or other memory medium.‖ For the 
good, the first non-price attribute was the number of recording hours, which had two 
levels: 50 hours and 300 hours. The second non-price attribute was the 
satisfaction/reliability rating with the DVR, which had two levels: 50% satisfaction and 
90% satisfaction. The price attribute for the good consisted of three levels ($100, $300, 
and $500) with a sufficiently wide range to cover reasonable prices (Haaijer and Wedel 
2007). The online music service was described as ―a service that works with a DVR that 
allows a subscriber to search for and listen to a vast number of songs, search for specific 
artists, listen to themed music channels, and create playlists.‖ For the service, the first 
non-price attribute was whether the music service allowed the user to listen to the 
service on any Internet-connected device, which had two levels: No Web Listening and 
Web Listening. For the purpose of the study, this attribute determined if the service was 
independent from the good. If the online music service did not allow web listening, the 
service was not independent; if the online music service did allow web listening, the 
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service was independent. The second non-price attribute was the satisfaction/reliability 
rating with the online music service, which had two levels: 50% satisfaction and 90% 
satisfaction. The price attribute for the service also consisted of three levels with a 
sufficiently wide range: $5 per month, $15 per month, and $25 per month. 
 A choice-based conjoint design was selected and administered using Sawtooth 
Software. Each respondent was presented with 14 random choice tasks and two fixed 
choice tasks. Each choice task consisted of three choices. As with Study 1, the 14 
random choice tasks were selected using the balanced overlap method. 
I measured complementarity between the good and the service for each 
respondent following the completion of the choice tasks. Respondents were asked: 
How much additional benefit do you think you would get from using a DVR 
and a Music Subscription together? Please rate the additional benefit from 1 
(Low Additional Benefit) to 7 (High Additional Benefit). If you do not think 
you would get any additional benefit, please select the No Additional Benefit 
option. 
 
3.4.2  Estimation of Willingness-to-Pay 
 I estimated the part-worth utilities and willingness-to-pay measures as in Study 1. 
As mentioned earlier, the conjoint design for Study 2 involves a hybrid bundle with six 
attributes: two non-price attributes each for the good and the service and one price 
attribute each for the good and the service. When calculating the willingness-to-pay for 
the good (the service), I treat the price attribute for the service (the good) as a non-price 
attribute. I calculated a willingness-to-pay measure for each respondent. 
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3.4.3  Results 
 As in Study 1, it is informative to begin with an examination of the aggregate 
conjoint results. These results appear in Table 3-2. Within each attribute, the aggregate 
part-worth utilities are in the expected direction, showing that consumers prefer 
spending less money to more money, more recording hours to fewer hours, a higher 
satisfaction rating to a lower satisfaction rating, and service independence to no service 
independence. Given the wide range of prices for the good, it is not surprising to see it 
have the highest importance at the aggregate level.  
 
Table 3-2 Aggregate Conjoint Results for Study 2 
Hybrid Bundle 
Component Attribute Level 
Part-Worth 
Utilities 
Average 
Importance 
Digital Video 
Recorder 
Price 
$100 0.804 
33.3 $300 0.109 
$500 –0.912 
Recording 
Hours 
300 hours 0.344 
13.3 
50 hours –0.344 
Satisfaction/ 
Reliability 
90% 0.403 
15.6 
50% –0.403 
Online Music 
Service 
Price 
$5/month 0.547 
20.2 $15/month –0.055 
$25/month –0.492 
Independence 
(Web Listening) 
Yes 0.310 
12.0 
No –0.310 
Satisfaction/ 
Reliability 
90% 0.143 
5.6 
50% –0.143 
 
 
 To test the relevant hypotheses, I use a repeated measures design in which more 
than one measure is obtained from each respondent. For this study, I obtain two 
willingness-to-pay measures from each respondent: one willingness-to-pay measure 
when the service is independent and one willingness-to-pay measure when the service is 
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not independent. Figure 3-3 provides a graphical depiction of the results for both the 
good and the service in the hybrid bundle. 
 
Figure 3-3 Study 2 Results 
  
(a) Willingness-to-Pay for Service (b) Willingness-to-Pay for Good 
 
 
 Hypotheses 2a and 3a state that when the service is independent from the good, 
consumers are willing to pay more for the service (2a) and for the good (3a). To test 
these hypotheses, I use a repeated measures MANOVA. The results support both 
hypotheses.  Respondents‘ willingness-to-pay measures are significantly higher for both 
the service (F1,81 = 91.45; p < 0.001) and for the good (F1,81 = 58.83; p < 0.001) when 
the service is independent from the good versus not independent. These results are 
represented in Figure 3-3 by the vertical separation between the Service Independent and 
Service Not Independent lines. 
$5
$15
$25
$35
Low High
W
T
P
 f
o
r 
S
er
v
ic
e
Complementarity
Service 
Independent
Service Not 
Independent
$75
$100
$125
$150
$175
$200
Low High
W
T
P
 f
o
r 
G
o
o
d
Complementarity
Service 
Independent
Service Not 
Independent
78 
 
 Hypotheses 4a and 4b state that consumers are willing to pay more for both the 
service (4a) and the good (4b) when complementarity between the good and service is 
high versus low. The results support hypothesis 4a, but not hypothesis 4b. Respondents‘ 
willingness-to-pay measures are significantly higher for the service (F1,81 = 6.36; p = 
.014) when they perceived the complementarity between the service and the good to be 
high versus low, but willingness-to-pay measures are not significantly higher for the 
good (F1,81 = 2.30; p = .133). These results are represented in Figure 3-3 by the slope of 
the lines. A steeper slope is more likely to be significant. 
 Hypotheses 5a and 6a state that there is an interaction between independence of 
the service from the good and complementarity on consumers‘ willingness-to-pay for 
both the service (5a) and the good (6a). The results support hypothesis 6a, but not 
hypothesis 5a. The difference in respondents‘ willingness-to-pay measures between an 
independent service and non-independent service is significantly higher under high 
complementarity than under low complementarity for the good (F1,81 = 8.72; p = .004), 
but not for the service (F1,81 = 0.44; p = .509). These results are represented in Figure 
3-3 by the difference in slopes between the Service Independent and Service Not 
Independent lines. For the good, the slopes are much more different than they are for the 
service. 
3.4.4  Discussion 
 The purpose of Study 2 was to explore several hypothesis regarding 
independence, complementarity, and the interaction of the two. As hypothesized, 
consumers‘ willingness-to-pay for both the service and the good is significantly greater 
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when the service is independent from the good. For willingness-to-pay for the service, 
this finding follows basic intuition. Consumers receive more direct benefit from the 
service if they can use it separately from the good. From an academic research 
perspective, bundling literature has addressed mixed bundling versus pure bundling and 
pure components. However, this finding extends previous research in an important way. 
While the hybrid bundle in this study was presented in a pure bundle setting, having the 
service independent from the good increases the willingness-to-pay for the service even 
within a pure bundle setting. This finding is also useful for practitioners. Managers of 
hybrid bundles need to be cognizant of consumers‘ higher willingness-to-pay for an 
independent service. For example, if TiVo‘s program guide also allowed consumers to 
record programs on their personal computer in addition to their TiVo DVR, TiVo could 
likely charge a price premium for this added independence. 
 The increased willingness-to-pay for the good when the service is independent is 
not quite as intuitive. One possible explanation is that increased familiarity and expertise 
with the service due to the ability to use it in more situations increases the utility a 
consumer receives from the good. From an academic research perspective, this finding 
suggests some spillover effects of independence of the service on the utility received 
from the good. This has not received attention in the traditional bundling literature, and 
is ripe for normative modeling. From a marketing practitioner perspective, this finding is 
just as important as the willingness-to-pay finding for the service. Managers of hybrid 
bundles should consider having higher prices for the good when the service is 
independent from the good. 
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 With respect to complementarity, the findings are mixed. While consumers‘ 
willingness-to-pay for the service is significantly higher with higher complementarity, 
the same cannot be said for the good. Complementarity has received considerable 
attention in the bundling literature, so the significant finding for the service is not 
surprising. While the finding for the good is not significant, the willingness-to-pay 
difference was in the expected direction. From a practitioner‘s perspective, these 
findings provide further support for having components within a hybrid bundle with high 
complementarity, as highly complementary components allow a price premium to be 
extracted. The asymmetric findings for the service and the good may be a function of 
how consumers perceive the service and the good. For example, consumers may 
consider the service more specialized and the good more commoditized. 
Complementarity may be of more importance for the specialized component. 
 A central part of Study 2 was to look at the interaction between complementarity 
and independence. While a direction was not hypothesized, the hypotheses receive 
mixed support from Study 2. While other research has suggested that higher levels of 
complementarity would dampen the effect of independence (Meyer and Shankar 2010) 
or the optimality of mixed bundling (e.g., Venkatesh and Kamakura 2003), the findings 
from Study 2 show the opposite. The difference in willingness-to-pay for the good when 
the service is independent versus not independent is significantly higher under high 
complementarity than under low complementarity. However, the same is not true for 
willingness-to-pay for the service. This finding offers new and unique insights into how 
complementarity and independence interact. Increased independence of the good or 
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service allows the consumer to use the good or service in more situations, increasing the 
familiarity and expertise with the bundle component. This increased familiarity may 
contribute to increased complementarity between the components. Further research in 
this area for both hybrid bundles and traditional bundles is warranted. If managers of 
hybrid bundles want to extract an even higher price premium for the good, both service 
independence and high complementarity are important. 
3.5  STUDY 3 
The third study focuses on the effects of quality variability, independence and 
complementarity on willingness-to-pay within a hybrid bundle setting. This study 
examines many of the hypotheses already tested in Study 1 and Study 2 (i.e., H1, H2a, 
H3a, H4, H5a, and H6a), as well as testing those hypotheses not yet explored (H2b, H3b, 
H5b, and H6b). To examine these questions, 132 undergraduate students at a U.S. 
university participated in a laboratory experiment for class credit. Of the 132 responses, 
14 were discarded as incomplete or unusable questionnaires, leaving 118 respondents 
available for final analysis. The average respondent age was 21.0 years and 54.7 percent 
of respondents were male. 
3.5.1  Conjoint Design 
As in Study 1, a hybrid bundle of a portable multimedia device (the good) and a 
streaming multimedia service (the service) was selected as the conjoint context. Once 
again, this hybrid bundle was selected for study because of subject interest and 
knowledge about portable multimedia players (similar to Apple iPod) and because of 
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subject interest in streaming or on-line multimedia services from a separate pretest (n = 
84). 
Both the good and the service had two non-price attributes and one price 
attribute. Therefore, each hybrid bundle profile consisted of six attributes that were 
presented to the respondents. The portable multimedia device was described as a device 
that ―plays audio and video, such as music and TV shows.‖ For the good, the first non-
price attribute was the screen size of the portable multimedia device, which had two 
levels: 2 inches and 4 inches. The second non-price attribute for the good was whether 
the portable multimedia device allowed for the use of the device with multiple streaming 
services, which also had two levels: Yes, the device can be used with other streaming 
multimedia services and No, the device cannot be used with other streaming multimedia 
services. For the purpose of the study, this attribute determined if the good was 
independent from the service. The price attribute for the good consisted of three levels 
($25, $100, and $175) with a sufficiently broad range to cover reasonable prices (Haaijer 
and Wedel 2007). The streaming multimedia service was described as a service that 
―sends wireless audio and video signals, such as music and TV shows, to a compatible 
player so you can listen or watch.‖ For the service, the first non-price attribute was the 
number of different music channels from which the user can choose, which had two 
levels: 50 channels and 150 channels. The second non-price attribute for the service was 
whether the streaming multimedia service could be used on other types of devices, 
which also had two levels: Yes, the streaming multimedia service can be used with other 
devices and No, the streaming multimedia service cannot be used with other devices. For 
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the purpose of the study, this attribute determined if the service was independent from 
the good. The price attribute for the service also consisted of three levels with a 
sufficiently wide range: $5 per month, $10 per month, and $15 per month. 
Quality variability was manipulated in the exact same way as Study 1, where 
respondents were once again presented with a visual scale (shown previously in 
Figure 3-1) to reinforce the narrow or wide distribution of service quality ratings. 
 A choice-based conjoint design was selected and administered using Sawtooth 
Software. Each respondent was presented with twelve random choice tasks and two 
fixed choice tasks. Each choice task consisted of three choices. As in Study 1 and Study 
2, the random choice tasks were selected using the balanced overlap method. 
 Similar to Study 2, complementarity between the good and the service was 
measured for each respondent following the completion of the choice tasks.  
Respondents were asked: 
Please rate how much additional benefit you think you would get from using 
the portable multimedia device and a streaming multimedia service together. 
Please rate the additional benefit from 1 (Low Additional Benefit) to 7 (High 
Additional Benefit). If you do not think you would get any additional benefit, 
please select the No Additional Benefit option. 
 
3.5.2  Estimation of Willingness-to-Pay 
 The part-worth utilities and willingness-to-pay measures are estimated as in 
Study 1 and Study 2. As discussed earlier, the conjoint design for Study 3 involves a 
hybrid bundle with six attributes: two non-price attributes each for the good and the 
service and one price attribute each for the good and the service. When calculating the 
willingness-to-pay for the good (the service), the price attribute for the service (the 
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good) is treated as a non-price attribute. A willingness-to-pay measure is calculated for 
each respondent in the study. 
3.5.3  Results 
 The aggregate conjoint results appear in Table 3-3. Within each attribute, the 
aggregate part-worth utilities are in the expected direction, as consumers prefer spending 
less money to more money, prefer larger screen sizes and more channels, and prefer 
good and service independence to no good and service independence. Using the fixed 
tasks as a holdout sample, the respondent choice was correctly selected in 59 percent of 
the cases. 
 
Table 3-3 Aggregate Conjoint Results for Study 3 
Hybrid 
Bundle 
Component Attribute Level 
Part-Worth Utilities Average Importance 
Low 
Service 
Quality 
Variability 
High 
Service 
Quality 
Variability 
Low 
Service 
Quality 
Variability 
High 
Service 
Quality 
Variability 
Portable 
Media 
Player 
Price 
$25 0.553 0.697 
19.9 27.7 $100 –0.001 0.079 
$175 –0.552 –0.776 
Independence 
from Service 
Yes 0.585 0.617 
21.1 23.2 
No –0.585 –0.617 
Screen Size 
4 inches 0.502 0.414 
18.1 15.6 
2 inches –0.502 –0.414 
Streaming 
Multimedia 
Service 
Price 
$5/month 0.475 0.402 
17.6 15.6 $10/month 0.025 0.023 
$15/month –0.500 –0.425 
Independence 
from Good 
Yes 0.373 0.264 
13.5 9.9 
No –0.373 –0.264 
Channels 
150 0.271 0.212 
9.8 8.0 
50 –0.271 –0.212 
 
 
 As in Study 1, H1 is tested using a one-way ANOVA with the Levene (1960) test 
for equality of variances. Figure 3-4 provides an error bar chart for the willingness-to-
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pay for the service under low and high service quality variability conditions. Although 
not as pronounced as in Study 1, the distribution of willingness-to-pay measures for the 
service is considerably wider under the high service quality variability condition versus 
the low service quality variability condition. The Levene test for homogeneity of 
variance confirms that the distribution under high service quality variability is 
significantly wider (F1,116 = 5.77; p = .018). Thus, as in Study 1, H1 is supported. 
 
Figure 3-4 Study 3 Error Bar Chart 
 
 
 
 To test the remaining hypotheses, I use a repeated measures design as in Study 2. 
For this study, I obtain many willingness-to-pay measures from each respondent based 
on the independence of the good and the service. 
 Hypothesis 2 is concerned with the willingness-to-pay measures of the service 
(2a) or the good (2b) when the service or good is independent, respectively. The results 
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support both hypotheses. Respondents‘ willingness-to-pay measures are significantly 
higher for the service when it is independent from the good (F1,115 = 27.82; p < .001) 
and for the good when it is independent from the service (F1,115 = 17.05; p < .001). 
These results are represented in Figure 3-5a by the vertical separation between the 
Service Independent and Service Not Independent lines (for H2a) and in Figure 3-5b by 
the vertical separation between the Good Independent and Good Not Independent lines 
(for H2b). 
 Hypothesis 3 is similar to H2, but focuses on the cross-effects of independence: 
the willingness-to-pay for the good when the service is independent (H3a) and the 
willingness-to-pay for the service when the good is independent (H3b). The results 
support both hypotheses. Respondents‘ willingness-to-pay measures are significantly 
higher for the good when the service is independent from the good (F1,115 = 15.98; p < 
.001) and for the service when the good is independent from the service (F1,115 = 36.88; 
p < .001). These results are represented in Figure 3-5d by the vertical separation between 
the Service Independent and Service Not Independent lines (for H3a) and in Figure 3-5c 
by the vertical separation between the Good Independent and Good Not Independent 
lines (for H3b). 
Hypothesis 4 states that consumers are willing to pay more for both the service 
(4a) and the good (4b) when they consider the hybrid bundle to have high 
complementarity versus low complementarity. In Study 2, this result is supported for the 
service, but not the good. In Study 3, both the hypotheses are supported. Respondents‘ 
willingness-to-pay measures are significantly higher for the service (F1,115 = 5.02; p = 
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.027) and for the good (F1,115 = 2.91; p = .091) when they perceive the complementarity 
between the service and the good to be high rather than low. These results are 
represented in Figure 3-5 by the slope of the lines.  A steeper slope suggests higher 
likelihood of significance. 
 
Figure 3-5 Study 3 Results 
  
(a) Willingness-to-Pay for Service with Service 
Independence (H2a, H4a, H5a) 
(b) Willingness-to-Pay for Good with Good 
Independence (H2b, H4b, H5b) 
  
(c) Willingness-to-Pay for Service with Good 
Independence (H3b, H4a, H6b) 
(d) Willingness-to-Pay for Good with Service 
Independence (H3a, H4b, H6a) 
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 Hypothesis 5 states that there is an interaction effect of independence and 
complementarity on consumers‘ willingness-to-pay. H5a examines the willingness-to-
pay for the service under an interaction between service independence and 
complementarity. H5b examines the willingness-to-pay for the good under an interaction 
between good independence and complementarity. The results support H5b, but not H5a. 
The difference in respondents‘ willingness-to-pay for the good between an independent 
good and non-independent good is significantly higher under high complementarity than 
under low complementarity (F1,115= 3.10; p = .081). However, the difference in 
respondents‘ willingness-to-pay for the service between an independent service and non-
independent service is not significantly different under high complementarity than under 
low complementarity (F1,115 = 1.63; p = .204). These results are represented in Figure  
3-5a and 3-5b by the difference in slopes between the Service (Good) Independent and 
Service (Good) Not Independent lines. When the good is independent, the slopes are less 
parallel than they are for when the service is independent. 
Hypothesis 6 is similar to H5, but is concerned with the cross-effects of 
independence and its interaction with complementarity. H6a (H6b) examines the 
willingness-to-pay for the good (service) under an interaction between service (good) 
independence and complementarity. The results support H6b, but not H6a. The 
difference in respondents‘ willingness-to-pay for the service between an independent 
good and non-independent good is significantly higher under high complementarity than 
under low complementarity (F1,115= 2.92; p = .090). However, the difference in 
respondents‘ willingness-to-pay for the good between an independent service and non-
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independent service is not significantly different under high complementarity than under 
low complementarity (F1,115 = 2.50; p = .117). These results are represented in Figure  
3-5c and 3-5d by the difference in slopes between the Service (Good) Independent and 
Service (Good) Not Independent lines. As before, when the good is independent, the 
slopes are less parallel than they are for when the service is independent. 
3.5.4  Discussion 
 The purpose of Study 3 was to explore all of the hypotheses in one, combined 
study. Of the 11 hypotheses, seven are tested in Study 1 or Study 2 and repeated in Study 
3. Of these seven, only two (H4b and H6a) have different results. The focus of this 
discussion will be on these two hypotheses and the four hypotheses not yet tested (H2b, 
H3b, H5b, and H6b). 
In Study 2, higher complementarity does not significantly increase respondents‘ 
willingness-to-pay for the good. However, in Study 3, I found marginal significance. 
This finding is consistent with extant literature. Nonetheless, it is interesting to find 
differential effects of complementarity on willingness-to-pay for a good and a service 
within a hybrid bundle. 
Furthermore, in Study 2, the effect of the interaction of service independence and 
complementarity on the willingness-to-pay for the good is significant. However, in 
Study 3, this effect is not significant (p > .10). A possible explanation for the mixed 
results across studies relates to the ratio of the prices of the good and service within the 
hybrid bundles. In Study 3, the ratios ranged from 1.67:1 to 35:1, whereas in Study 2, the 
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ratios ranged from 4:1 to 100:1. These different ratios could be affecting respondents‘ 
perceptions of the value of service independence under high and low complementarity. 
As hypothesized, consumers‘ willingness-to-pay for both the service and the 
good is significantly greater when the good is independent from the service. The results 
mirror the results from Study 2 and Study 3, in which consumers‘ willingness-to-pay for 
both the service and the good is significantly greater when service is independent from 
the good than vice-versa. The intuition behind the results is also a mirror image of that 
for Study 2. Consumers receive more direct benefits from the good if they can use it 
separately from the service. The increased willingness-to-pay for the service when the 
good is independent is not quite as intuitive, but it suggests some spillover effects of 
independence of one component on the utility received from the other component. 
 As in Study 2, a key focus in Study 3 is the interaction between complementarity 
and independence, particularly when the good is independent from the service. The 
findings show that the difference in willingness-to-pay for both the good and the service 
when the good is independent versus not independent is significantly higher under high 
complementarity than under low complementarity. As mentioned in Study 2, this finding 
offers new and unique insights into how complementarity and independence interact.  
3.6  SYNTHESIS OF THE STUDIES AND THEORETICAL AND MANAGERIAL 
IMPLICATIONS 
 Table 3-4 shows a summary of the hypotheses and the findings across all three 
studies. I find full support for eight of the 11 hypotheses, partial support for two 
hypotheses, and no support for one hypothesis. The three studies covered three factors: 
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service quality variability, independence, and complementarity. I offer a summary of the 
findings and provide theoretical and managerial implications for the effects of these 
factors. 
 
Table 3-4 Summary of Results 
Focus  Hypothesis Study 1 Study 2 Study 3 
Quality Variability 1:   
       
    
 *** — ** 
Independence 
2a:   
     
    — *** *** 
2b:   
     
    — — *** 
3a:   
     
    — *** *** 
3b:   
     
    — — *** 
Complementarity 
4a:   
     
   — ** ** 
4b:   
     
   — N.S. * 
Interaction of 
Independence and 
Complementarity 
5a:   
       
        
        
      
 — N.S. N.S. 
5b:   
       
        
        
      
 — — * 
6a:   
       
        
        
      
 — *** N.S. 
6b:   
       
        
        
      
 — — * 
*** = p < 0.01     ** = p < 0.05     * = p < 0.1     N.S. = Not Significant (p > 0.1)     — = Not Applicable 
 σ = variance     μ = mean     S = service     G = good     H = high     L = low     QV = quality variability 
I = independent     NI = not independent     C = complementarity 
 
 
 Heterogeneity in service quality is an overlooked aspect of pricing of hybrid 
bundles in particular, and pricing of services in general. The quality variability of 
services within hybrid bundles can have important implications on consumers‘ 
willingness-to-pay for hybrid bundles and firms‘ pricing of hybrid bundles. I 
hypothesized that higher quality variability of a service within a hybrid bundle is 
associated with a wider distribution of willingness-to-pay measures across consumers. 
My findings support this hypothesis. This finding is significant for several reasons. First, 
it extends pricing research on bundles and services in a direction that has not previously 
been explored, opening avenues for additional research that can have a meaningful 
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impact on academic research and marketing practice. Second, it provides guidance to 
managers of hybrid bundles that contain high quality variable services. Specifically, the 
wider willingness-to-pay distribution of services with high quality variability may offer 
managers a high level of latitude in the pricing of the service within a hybrid bundle. 
 Independence is the extent to which the good and service can be used separately 
from each other (Shankar, Berry, and Dotzel 2009). I argued that the ability to use the 
components within a hybrid bundle separately should increase the consumer‘s utility, 
resulting in higher willingness-to-pay. The results support this argument for both the 
good and the service when either the good or the service is independent from the other. 
The direct-effects (e.g., higher willingness-to-pay for the good when the good is 
independent) are intuitive and straightforward, while the cross-effects (e.g., higher 
willingness-to-pay for the good when the service is independent) are not as 
straightforward. Both the findings are important. First, previous literature focuses only 
on the purchase aspect of independence, not on the usage aspect. My research extends 
prior literature and sheds light on a previously unexplored aspect of bundling—the usage 
of the components. Second, managers who market hybrid bundles must be mindful that 
in addition to purchase situation, the independence of components in their use is 
important in pricing. Third, managers should be aware of the cross-effects of 
independence on pricing and can charge a price premium on a component when the 
other component in the hybrid bundle is independent. However, the level of competition 
also influences the ability of managers of hybrid bundles to charge a price premium for 
independent components. For example, if a competitor offers a similar service that can 
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be used with the good, it may be more difficult for the manager to charge a price 
premium. 
 Complementarity is the degree to which the utility to the customer increases 
when the product and the service are used together (Shankar, Berry, and Dotzel 2009). I 
argued that willingness-to-pay increases with complementarity. This hypothesis is 
partially supported by the findings. Complementarity has a greater positive effect on the 
willingness-to-pay for the service than for the good. This asymmetric effect has 
significant theoretical implications. Prior research has largely assumed the effects to be 
the same for each component in the bundle. My findings suggest that a richer theory 
needs to be developed. My results also imply that to extract a price premium, managers 
of hybrid bundles may want to find ways of increasing complementarity between the 
good and the service components. 
 I also explored the interaction between independence and complementarity. This 
interaction is an aspect that has received little attention in extant literature, so the 
findings open up an exciting new aspect of bundling. I argued that the interactive effects 
could be either positive or negative. In other words, the difference in willingness-to-pay 
between independence and no independence could be either greater or smaller with high 
complementarity relative to low complementarity. While the findings are mixed with 
respect to significance, all the results point to a positive moderation. This finding is 
especially true when the good is independent from the service. For marketers of hybrid 
bundles, having goods independent from the service can enable the company to extract 
an even higher price premium when the components are highly complementary. 
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3.7  LIMITATIONS, FUTURE RESEARCH, AND CONCLUSION 
3.7.1  Limitations and Future Research 
The limitations of the research presented in this essay all suggest future research 
directions. First, the conjoint designs used in this essay are not incentive-aligned. Ding 
(2007), Ding, Grewal, and Liechty (2005) and Voelckner (2007) show that under certain 
conditions, estimates from incentive aligned approaches provide more precise results 
than those from other methods. It would be worthwhile to retest the hypotheses using 
incentive aligned approaches. 
 Second, I measured complementarity for each respondent using a scale question, 
and it may be fruitful to consider other methods of measuring complementarity. For 
example, it may be possible to measure and compare the willingness-to-pay for the 
hybrid bundle to the sum of the willingness-to-pay for each component within the hybrid 
bundle. This ratio would be similar to a measure of complementarity that has been used 
in the analytical models of bundling (e.g., Meyer and Shankar 2010; Venkatesh and 
Kamakura 2003). 
 Third, the conjoint designs used in the studies were of pure bundling form, 
regardless of whether the components were independent or not. My finding that 
independence increases willingness-to-pay is significant because it is true in pure 
bundling. Allowing for other bundling forms, such as mixed bundling or pure 
components would be a useful extension. This will also allow for examining if the 
service attributes are perceived differently than the goods attributes by some 
respondents. 
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 Fourth, I did not examine the quality variability of the good. While it is 
reasonable to assume that the findings related to quality variability of the good would be 
similar to that of service, it would be worthwhile to test it. Similarly, I did not address 
the effect of quality variability on the mean willingness-to-pay. However, the results 
from Studies 2 and 3 suggest that there is perhaps an optimism bias where respondents 
believe they are less likely to get a service with poor quality (Tanner and Carlson 2008). 
Therefore, higher quality variability with equal mean quality results in higher 
willingness-to-pay measures. This is an interesting avenue for future research and can 
have important implications for the pricing of goods and services. 
 Fifth, I found asymmetric effects for independence and complementarity for the 
willingness-to-pay for the good and the service. My results show that complementarity is 
more important for the service than for the good, but the interaction between 
complementarity and independence is more important when the good is independent 
than when the service is independent. These asymmetric effects deserve a deeper 
examination by future research. 
 Sixth, in real life purchase situations, consumers have the option of not purchase.  
However, the choice-based conjoint studies used in this research did not allow 
respondents to select a ―No Purchase‖ option. Research on conjoint analysis has shown 
that the inclusion of a ―No Purchase‖ option can increase the model fit and decrease the 
bias in estimates (e.g., Haaijer, Kamakura, and Wedel 2001). 
 Seventh, all three studies use hi-tech bundles of a good and a service. 
Consumers‘ perceptions of hi-tech goods and services may be different from perceptions 
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of a hybrid bundle with a ―low-tech‖ good and people-intensive service, such as 
carpeting and installation. Further exploration of the effects of quality variability, 
independence, and complementarity is warranted in other bundle settings. 
 Finally, prior research, especially analytic models, suggest that  high 
complementarity can reduce the optimality of mixed bundling relative to pure bundling 
(Venkatesh and Kamakura 2003) and the optimality of independence relative to no 
independence (Meyer and Shankar 2010). However, the findings from this essay suggest 
otherwise. Future research could identify the conditions under which these different 
results can be obtained. 
3.7.2  Conclusion  
 Many traditional manufacturing companies and traditional service companies are 
increasingly selling hybrid bundles—bundles comprising one or more goods and one or 
more services. The pricing of such hybrid bundles—critical to success and profitability 
of firms selling these bundles—hinges on a better understanding of consumer 
willingness-to-pay for the bundle and its components. I examined the effects of three 
important factors, quality variability, independence, and complementarity, on 
willingness-to-pay using choice based conjoint experiments estimated through 
hierarchical Bayesian analysis. The results show that higher quality variability of a 
service within a hybrid bundle is associated with a wider distribution of willingness-to-
pay, independence between the good and the service in the bundle has positive direct- 
and cross-effects on willingness-to-pay, complementarity between the good and the 
service has a greater positive effect on the willingness-to-pay for the service than for the 
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good, and independence and complementarity interact to increase willingness-to-pay. 
These results offer important guidelines for managers to develop premium-priced hybrid 
bundles.  
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CHAPTER IV 
AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF HYBRID BUNDLE PRICING 
 
4.1  INTRODUCTION 
In both the business-to-consumer (B2C) and business-to-business (B2B) sectors, 
a growing number of firms are offering bundles of goods and services together in 
competitive settings. These hybrid bundles can be seen across a variety of manufacturing 
and retailing settings.  BMW offers a hybrid bundle comprising a new vehicle and a total 
maintenance program. Best Buy offers hybrid bundles comprising home theater 
components and professional home theater setup. GE Medical Systems offers hybrid 
bundles comprising medical imaging machines with training and maintenance services. 
Together with its suite of network products, 3Com offers many services ranging from 
installation and assessment, maintenance, and training.  
 A hybrid bundle is a ―a single firm‘s offering that combines one or more goods 
with one or more services, creating greater customer benefit than if the good(s) and 
service(s) were available separately‖ (Meyer and Shankar 2010). Within this definition 
lie two key criteria. First, the offering comes from a single firm, essentially ensuring that 
the firm gets revenue from both the good(s) and the service(s). Second, the use of the 
good(s) and service(s) together creates greater customer benefit. In other words, a 
customer‘s utility from purchasing or using the components together is greater than the 
sum of the utilities from purchasing or using each component separately. 
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Although data on the size of the market for all hybrid bundles is unavailable, it is 
evident market opportunity is growing. One estimate is that the sales of services sold 
together with durable goods increased by nearly 200 percent from 1995 to 2004 
(Auguste, Harmon, and Pandit 2006). Added profits from joining services with goods – 
or vice versa – can be considerable. Otis Elevators claims that 90 percent of its operating 
profits from 2002 to 2008 were generated by repair and maintenance services even 
though Otis is known as a manufacturer (Shankar, Berry, and Dotzel 2009).  
Although hybrid bundles are here to stay and grow, research on hybrid bundles is 
in its infancy. There is conceptual (Shankar, Berry, and Dotzel 2009), analytical (Meyer 
and Shankar 2010), and experimental (Meyer, Shankar, and Berry 2010) research on 
hybrid bundles. However, little empirical research exists on the factors that drive the 
demand of the hybrid bundle components. This essay aims to fill this gap in the 
literature. Specifically, this essay seeks to answer the following questions: What are the 
direct- and cross-effects of pricing of the good and service components on the demand 
for these components? Are these effects symmetric?  
I organize the remainder of the essay as follows. I begin with conceptual 
development, including a discussion of the relevant literature on bundling, contingent 
products, and cross-selling. I then discuss the data and context. I present the model and 
the results of the estimation. I discuss the implications, highlight the key limitations and 
areas for future research, and conclude with the takeaways. 
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4.2  CONCEPTUAL DEVELOPMENT AND RELATED RESEARCH 
 Bundling, defined as ―the sale of two or more products in a package‖ 
(Stremersch and Tellis 2002), has a rich history in marketing and economics. Bundles 
can be classified as either product bundles or price bundles. Product bundle components 
are integrated and are sold at any price, while price bundle components are not 
integrated and are sold at a discount (Stremersch and Tellis 2002). By definition, hybrid 
bundles are product bundles as the purchase or use of their components adds additional 
customer benefit. Product bundles can further be classified into three forms: pure 
bundles (i.e., components only sold together), pure components (i.e., components only 
sold separately), and mixed bundles (i.e., components sold both together and separately). 
Hybrid bundles differ from traditional bundles of goods or bundles of services. 
First, many services are labor-intensive. The labor-intensive nature means that the 
components of the bundle often vary widely in quality variability and scalability, with 
the service being higher in quality variability and lower in scalability. Second, hybrid 
bundles are often presented to consumers with separate prices for each component, 
contrasting with traditional bundles, which are usually presented at a single price. For 
example, TiVo‘s hybrid bundle offering lists separate prices for the digital video 
recorder and the program guide, whereas Time Warner Cable‘s bundle of cable 
television, internet, and digital phone has a single list price. Third, many hybrid bundles 
involve a good that is used continuously and a service that is used intermittently. For 
example, Best Buy‘s home theater and professional setup bundle consists of a home 
theater that is used regularly and a service that is often used only once. Fourth, hybrid 
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bundles expand on the idea of bundle form to consider the independence of the good and 
the service. Independence is ―the extent to which the good and service are available and 
can be used independent of each other‖ (Meyer and Shankar 2010). Independence is at 
the component level, meaning that both the good and the service can be independent or 
not independent. For example, TiVo‘s digital video recorder has little functionality 
without the program guide, and vice versa, and both components would be classified as 
having no independence. However, Best Buy‘s home theater can be purchased and used 
without the professional setup, while the professional setup cannot be used without the 
purchase of the home theater. In this case, the home theater is independent, but the 
professional setup is not. 
Much of the extant research on bundling is either analytical or experimental. 
Researchers have looked at bundling as a price discrimination tool (e.g., Venkatesh and 
Mahajan 1993), complementarity among bundle components (e.g., Venkatesh and 
Kamakura 2003), mixed bundling optimality (e.g., Venkatesh and Kamakura 2003), 
component costs (e.g., Hanson and Martin 1990), and perceptions of savings (e.g., 
Yadav and Monroe 1993). Although empirical research on bundling is scarce, 
researchers have empirically examined topics that share similarities with bundling, such 
as cross-category purchasing. 
In cross-category purchasing, if lowering the price of one product increases the 
demand for another product, then the two products are considered complements. If two 
products in different categories are complements, one would expect cross-category 
correlations to be positive. Much research in this area has used market basket analysis. 
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Russell and Petersen (2000) develop a global utility model where consumer preference 
for a product can be contingent on the consumption of items in other product categories. 
Using four household paper goods categories, they find small cross-price effects. 
Manchanda, Ansari, and Gupta (1999) develop a multivariate probit model applied to a 
consumer‘s shopping basket, allowing for both complementarity and co-incidence. 
Applying their model to two sets of complementary categories, they also find small 
cross-price elasticities. Song and Chintagunta (2006, 2007) add brand into the mix and 
find higher negative cross-price elasticities for certain brand combinations, but also 
highlight the asymmetries between categories where the price effect of brand A on brand 
B is different than the price effect of brand B on brand A. Mehta (2007) also looks at 
brand and category purchase incidence and finds much smaller cross-price effects than 
direct-price effects. Finally, Niraj, Padmanabhan, and Seetharaman (2008) use a two 
stage bivariate logit model that allows for cross-category correlations in both incidence 
and quantity. Using bacon and eggs as the complementary categories, they find that the 
cross-price effects on incidence are negative and significant. However, while bacon‘s 
cross-price effect on quantity of eggs purchased is significant, the same is not true for 
eggs‘ cross-price effect on quantity of bacon purchased. A comparison of the relevant 
research is shown in Table 4-1. 
One commonality across the cross-category purchase stream of research is the 
use of frequently purchased consumer packaged goods. There is a dearth of empirical 
research on cross-category effects in durable goods or services. Many hybrid bundles  
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would not be classified as frequently purchased items. Therefore, there is little guidance 
on the expected cross-category effects of components within a hybrid bundle. 
The general model for pricing of hybrid bundles is shown in Figure 4-1. I expect 
the direct-price effect on the demand of a component within a hybrid bundle to be 
negative. Given that hybrid bundles contain complementary components, and consistent 
with findings in cross-category research, I also expect the cross-price effect of one 
component on the demand of another component within a hybrid bundle to be negative. 
Similarly, I expect both the direct- and cross-promotion effects on demand of 
components within a hybrid bundle to be positive. Next, provided that the hybrid bundle 
allows for independence between the good and the service, I expect the demand of the 
good to have a positive effect on the demand of the service, and vice versa. Finally, 
competitor price and promotion, along with customer and provider characteristics, affect 
the demand for the good and the service within a hybrid bundle. 
 
Figure 4-1 Factors Affecting Demand of Hybrid Bundles 
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4.3  CONTEXT AND DATA 
 To answer the research questions using the model in Figure 4-1, I obtained data 
from a major U.S. specialty retailer that markets a hybrid bundle comprising carpet (the 
good) and installation (the service). The retail carpet industry offers an excellent context 
to empirically study pricing of hybrid bundles. It is a huge industry that pervades nearly 
all the households in the U.S. In 2007, U.S. carpet and rug mills had an estimated $13.5 
billion in revenue (Rajakumar 2010), and carpet laying and removal contractors had 
combined revenues of about $5.7 billion (Kelly 2010). Furthermore, total industry 
shipments of carpet were 14.4 billion square feet, and carpet covers nearly 70 percent of 
the flooring in the U.S. (CRI 2010). 
 Hybrid bundles where the service is an installation are common in many retail 
settings. Electronics retailers offer installation on a variety of goods, such as home 
theater components, automobile audio and video components, and computers and home 
networking. Major home improvement retailers often offer installation services for 
appliances, garage door openers, doors and windows, window treatments, and many 
other goods. Some of the goods in these hybrid bundles are similar to carpeting in which 
the quantity of the good purchased can vary from customer to customer. For example, 
one customer may purchase a window treatment for only one window, whereas another 
customer may purchase window treatments for the whole house. 
The carpet and installation data are transactional over a 15 month period starting 
in January 2009. The data set is a random sample of approximately 3,700 household 
transactions involving the purchase of at least 100 square feet of carpet during the 15 
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month period. For this retailer‘s hybrid bundle, the installation is not independent, but 
the carpet is. In other words, consumers can purchase the carpet and not the installation, 
but they cannot purchase the installation without purchasing the carpet. The data set 
includes the quantity of carpet purchased (in square feet), the incidence of installation 
purchases, the price and cost per square foot for the carpet, the price and cost of basic 
installation, the brand and type of carpet purchased, and a variety of household 
demographics such as distance to store, distance to nearest competitor, home value, 
marital status, and number of children. 
Table 4-2 reports basic descriptive statistics. Note that 86 percent of transactions 
include the purchase of installation. For this retailer, the installation is priced at a flat 
rate. However, consumers typically view this figure against the quantity of carpet they 
buy, so implicitly they have a mental estimate of the installation price in terms of price 
per square foot. Both forms of installation prices (absolute and per unit square foot) are 
available in the data. 
4.4  MODEL DEVELOPMENT 
 Due to limitations in the available data, I could not fully estimate the model 
presented in Figure 4-1. However, I estimated two subsets of the models in Figure 4-1, 
which are shown in Figure 4-2. Table 4-3 provides the correlation matrix for the relevant 
variables used to model both the installation purchase decision and the carpet demand 
quantity decision. 
  
107 
 
Table 4-2 Descriptive Statistics 
  Install Purchase 
  Yes No 
Household Transactions N 3170 523 
Carpet Quantity (Ft
2
) 
Mean 
(St. Dev.) 
633 
(348) 
454 
(416) 
Carpet Price ($ per Ft
2
) 
Mean 
(St. Dev.) 
2.11 
(.73) 
2.00 
(.71) 
Total Install Price ($)
 a
 
Mean 
(St. Dev.) 
105 
(39) 
107 
(20) 
Install Price ($ per Ft
2
) 
a
 
Mean 
(St. Dev.) 
.24 
(.19) 
.39 
(.27) 
Home Value ($ 000s)
 b Mean 
(St. Dev.) 
229 
(184) 
199 
(169) 
Nearest Competitor(Miles) 
Mean 
(St. Dev.) 
8.76 
(11.29) 
9.42 
(11.42) 
a  Install price when no installation is purchased is estimated based on weekly 
 average installation prices. 
b  Home value is based on the mid-point of 19 home value ranges. 
 
 
Figure 4-2 Factors Affecting Demand of Installation and Carpet 
 
(a) Installation Demand for All Purchasers 
 
(b) Carpet Demand for Installation Purchasers 
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 Table 4-3 Correlation Matrix 
 
Carpet 
Quantity 
Install 
Purchase 
Carpet 
Price per 
Ft2 
Install 
Price 
Install 
Price per 
Ft2 
Nearest 
Comp. 
Home 
Value 
Carpet Quantity 1 
 
0.152 * -0.028 
 
0.117 * -0.633 * -0.002 
 
0.097 * 
Install Purchase 
  
1 
 
0.051 * -0.014 
 
-0.246 * 0.005 
 
0.058 * 
Carpet Price per Ft2 
    
1 
 
-0.136 * -0.041 * -0.002 
 
0.072 * 
Install Price 
      
1 
 
0.344 * -0.059 * 0.063 * 
Install Price per Ft2 
        
1 
 
-0.033 * -0.010 
 
Nearest Competitor 
          
1 
 
-0.092 * 
Home Value 
            
1 
 
  * p < .05 
 
 
4.4.1  Installation Purchase Decision 
The purchase decision for installation, as shown in Figure 4-2a, is modeled first. 
A household decides to purchase either one unit of installation or no installation at all. 
Therefore, the installation purchase decision is a binary choice and must be modeled 
appropriately using a latent variable model: 
         
  
                                     
                       
   
             
  (4.1) 
                            
     (4.2) 
where i is household transaction, INSTALL is a binary variable equal to 1 if installation 
was purchased, ISTPRICE is the basic installation price, CPTQNTY is the quantity of 
carpet purchased in square feet, CPTPRICE is the carpet price per square feet, NRCMP 
is the distance from the household to the nearest competitor, HMVAL is the estimated 
home value for the household, MONTH is a vector of 11 dummy variables denoting the 
month of the year of the household‘s transaction (with December as the base month),   
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are parameter vectors, and   is an i.i.d. error term. Thus, Equation 4.1 is the probit 
model. 
However, both installation price and carpet price are endogenous. Therefore, an 
instrumental variable approach can be used as in Rivers and Vuong (1988) and 
Wooldridge (2002). In this approach, there are two instrumental variable regressions: 
           
                                     
                          
   
         
      
   
                
 
       
      
   
             
 (4.3) 
           
                                     
                          
   
         
      
   
                
 
       
      
   
             
 (4.4) 
where ISTCST is the basic installation cost, CPTCST is the carpet cost per square foot, 
TYPE is a vector of six dummy variables denoting the product type of carpet (with type 
other set as the base), BRAND is a vector of eight dummy variables denoting the brand 
of carpet (with brand unknown set as the base), PL is a vector of two dummy variables 
denoting if the carpet is part of two retailer specific product lines,   are parameter 
vectors,   and   are error terms, and the other terms are as defined earlier. Equations 4.3 
and 4.4 are estimated separately, with the residuals,    and   , calculated and saved. 
These are then added to the probit model in equation 4.1 to get consistent coefficient 
estimates. In addition, the price of the carpet is observable, but the price of the 
installation is only observable for those who purchase the installation. For those 
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transactions that an installation is not purchased, an estimated installation price is used 
by averaging across all install rates for the given week.  
4.4.2  Carpet Demand 
 In the general model presented in Figure 4-1, I expect the demand for the service 
to have a positive effect on the demand for the good. However, not all hybrid bundles 
behave in this manner. In particular, some hybrid bundles consist of a focal component 
and a secondary component. The carpet and installation hybrid bundle behaves in the 
manner, with the carpet being the focal component and the installation the secondary 
component. Therefore, there is no expected cross-demand effect where the installation 
purchase drives the quantity of carpet purchased. This reasoning leads to the model in 
Figure 4-2b. 
 As in the estimation for installation demand, I observe the installation price only 
for those transactions for which installation is purchased. While I use the average weekly 
installation price in the installation demand estimation, I perform the estimation for 
carpet demand using only those transactions where an installation was purchased. 
 I expect carpet demand to follow a multiplicative functional form model as 
shown in Equation 4.5. Multiplicative models are commonly used to model sales 
response and a key benefit of such models is that the relevant parameters can be 
interpreted as elasticities (Hanssens, Parsons, and Schultz 2003).  
        
           
          
        
  
       
       
   
             
 (4.5) 
As shown in equation 4.6, I use the log-log form of the multiplicative model, 
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 (4.6) 
where CHQNT is the quantity of carpet purchase in 100 square feet, CHNDPRC is the 
carpet price per 100 square feet, IHNDPRC is the basic installation price per 100 square 
feet,   are parameter vectors,   is the error term, and the remaining terms are as defined 
earlier. 
As before, the carpet price and installation price are endogenous. To account for 
their endogeneity, I use the two-stage least squares (2SLS) approach. In addition to the 
exogenous variables in equation 4.6, the instruments for the first stage regressions are 
the carpet type, brand, and product line dummy variables, as in the installation demand 
equation, along with the log of the carpet and installation cost per 100 square feet. 
4.5  EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
4.5.1  Installation Purchase Decision 
 The estimation results (minus the monthly dummies) are shown in Table 4-4. The 
direct effect of installation price on the probability of installation purchase is significant 
and in the expected direction (                ). Based on the change in 
probability for installation price, a $10 increase in the price of installation at the sample 
means results in a .040 decrease in the probability of purchasing the installation. The 
cross-effect of carpet price on the probability of installation purchase is also significant 
(                ). The quantity of carpet purchased has a significant effect in 
the expected direction (               ). At the sample means, a 100 square foot 
increase in carpet purchased increases the probability of installation purchase by .02. 
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Table 4-4  Installation Purchase Estimation Results 
Variable 
Coefficient 
(Std. Error) p > |z| 
Change in 
Probability 
Installation Price 
–.0193 
(.0036) 
<.001 –.0040 
Carpet Quantity 
.0009 
(.0001) 
<.001 .0002 
Carpet Price per ft
2 –.1221 
(.0549) 
.026 –.0254 
Nearest Competitor 
–.0044 
(.0025) 
.073 –.0009 
Home Value 
.0006 
(.0002) 
<.001 .0001 
INTERCEPT 
2.5564 
(.4051) 
<.001  
   
                                     
*
4 of the 11 monthly dummies are significant  
 
 
 Based on the estimation results, the expected effects of Figure 4-2a are 
confirmed. The direct- and cross-price effects on the probability of installation purchase 
are both negative and significant. The biggest driver of the probability of installation 
purchase appears to be carpet quantity. Intuitively, this makes sense. The more carpet a 
household purchases, the less likely the customer would want to personally install the 
carpet. The distance to the nearest competitor is marginally significant (   
             ). The further a customer is from a major competitor, the less likely 
they are to purchase the installation. Closeness to a major competitor allows the 
customer to more easily compare prices. Because the focal retailer and major competitor 
often have similar installation prices, the customer is better able to judge the value of the 
installation, inducing installation purchase. Home value has a significant positive effect 
on the probability of installation purchase (               ). Intuitively, this is 
expected. Higher home values are likely associated with higher disposable incomes and 
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a greater ability to pay for the installation. In addition, four of the 11 monthly dummy 
variables are significant, indicating some moderate seasonality. The significant 
seasonality occurs during the peak home buying months of May through August. During 
these months, customers are moving into existing homes and want to replace the carpet 
to match their preferences for color and type. 
4.5.2  Carpet Demand 
The results of the estimation appear in Table 4-5. As expected, the direct carpet 
price elasticity of carpet demand is negative and significant (                ). A 
one percent decrease (increase) in the price of carpet per 100 square feet leads to a .38 
percent increase (decrease) in the quantity of carpet purchased. The cross installation 
price elasticity of carpet demand is also negative and significant (            
    ). A one percent decrease (increase) in the price of installation per 100 square feet 
leads to a .85 percent increase (decrease) in the quantity of carpet purchased. The 
distance to the nearest competitor has a significant negative effect on carpet demand 
(                ). A one percent increase (decrease) in distance to nearest 
competitor decreases (increases) carpet quantity purchased by .03 percent. As in the 
installation purchase, closeness to a major competitor allows customers to better 
evaluate the value of the carpet purchase, inducing them to purchase more carpet. The 
home value has a significant positive effect on carpet demand (               ). 
A one percent increase (decrease) in home value leads to a .04 percent increase 
(decrease) in quantity of carpet purchased. Intuitively, this is as expected. Higher home 
values are associated with larger homes and greater disposable income, leading to 
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greater quantities of carpet purchased. Ten of the 11 monthly dummy variables are 
significant, indicating much seasonality. 
 
Table 4-5 Carpet Demand Estimation Results 
Variable 
Coefficient 
(Std. Error) z p > |z| 
ln(Carpet Price per 100 ft
2
) 
–.3852 
(.0368) 
–10.45 <.001 
ln(Installation Price per 100 ft
2
) 
–.8462 
(.0314) 
–26.91 <.001 
ln(Nearest Competitor) 
–.0310 
(.0100) 
–3.10 .002 
ln(Home Value) 
.0433 
(.0123) 
3.52 <.001 
INTERCEPT 
5.6466 
(.2509) 
22.50 <.001 
   
                                      
*
10 of the 11 monthly dummies are significant  
 
 
4.6  DISCUSSION AND MANAGERIAL IMPLICATIONS 
4.6.1  Installation Purchase 
 The results show that the decision to purchase installation is largely driven by the 
amount of carpet purchased, with higher quantities of carpet purchased resulting in a 
higher likelihood of purchasing installation. Intuitively, this makes sense on two fronts. 
First, the more carpet a household purchases, the more difficult it would be for the 
household to install it on their own, and the more expensive it might be for the 
household to hire a third party to install. Second, households purchasing higher 
quantities of carpet spend more money on the carpet. As this phenomenon occurs, the 
firm can allocate to the good a higher percentage of the hybrid bundle‘s cost to the 
consumer. Consequently, the service appears more attractive than the good as the price 
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of the service is mostly fixed. Marketers of hybrid bundles that follow this pricing 
scheme (i.e., per unit pricing on the good, flat pricing on the service) should highlight 
the enhanced price-value for the service with higher quantities of good purchased. 
 While the purchase installation decision is negatively affected by the price of the 
installation and the price of the carpet, the direct effect of installation price is greater. At 
first glance, this may not seem to be the case. However a $1 increase in installation price 
is a very small increase, while a $1 increase in carpet price per square foot is a very large 
increase. At the sample means, a 10 percent increase in carpet price would decrease the 
probability of installation purchase by only .0053, whereas a 10 percent increase in 
installation price would decrease the probability of installation purchase by .0423. For 
marketers of hybrid bundles of this type, the price of the good should be considered, but 
should be secondary to the price of the service as the latter has a much larger effect on 
the decision to purchase the service and the quantity of carpet purchased, as I show in 
the following sub-section. 
4.6.2  Quantity of Carpet Demanded 
 The results from the carpet quantity estimation are interesting. While both the 
direct- and cross-price effects are significant and in the expected directions, the 
magnitude of the cross-price effect is much higher than past research on cross-category 
price elasticities suggests. The cross-price elasticity of the service on the demand of the 
good is more than twice as large as the direct-price elasticity. This difference is 
significant (  
                 and has important managerial implications. When 
consumers convert their flat installation price to an installation price per square foot, it 
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can have a dramatic effect on the quantity of carpet purchased. Marketers of such hybrid 
bundles should highlight the low installation price per square foot when appropriate, and 
emphasize that additional carpet purchased reduces the overall square foot price. The 
price of the service in this hybrid bundle has a great deal of leverage. 
4.7  LIMITATIONS, FUTURE RESEARCH, AND CONCLUSION 
4.7.1  Limitations and Future Research 
The limitations of the research are largely data related and suggest future 
research directions as better data are obtained. First, lack of data on the price and cost of 
basic installation for transactions that do not purchase installation creates problems in 
the analysis. The installations are normally flat priced, but vary over time and location. 
With data on the flat pricing for a given time and location, it would be possible to 
generate a better estimate of the installation price for non-installation purchasers and 
result in more accurate estimation results. 
Second, the installation service is very labor-intensive. The quality variability of 
this component could have important pricing implications (Meyer and Shankar 2010; 
Meyer, Shankar, and Berry 2010). Information on the quality variability of the 
installation would be helpful in isolating its pricing implications. This information may 
be available at the store or transaction level, but was not available for the current 
research. 
Third, the model could not be estimated simultaneously. The carpet quantity and 
installation purchase decision may be made either simultaneously or recursively. 
However, given the binary installation purchase decision, simultaneous estimation is not 
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appropriate. Future research may explore similar settings using a simultaneous system 
that allows equations with binary dependent variables. 
Fourth, this research is for one specific type of hybrid bundle. Additional 
empirical research on other similar and dissimilar types of hybrid bundles should be 
undertaken to enhance the generalizability of the findings. 
Finally, to fully estimate the model in Figure 4-1, additional information is 
needed on competitive pricing and promotion, as well as direct promotion. With these 
data, a more complete model of pricing hybrid bundles in a competitive setting can be 
constructed. 
4.7.2  Conclusion 
 The marketing of hybrid bundles—bundles comprising both goods and 
services—is becoming more prevalent as firms seek to gain additional revenue streams. 
It is critical for marketers of hybrid bundles to understand the pricing implications of the 
good and the service within the bundle. This essay proposed a general framework and 
model for pricing of hybrid bundles in a retail setting with competition. Portions of this 
framework were tested using empirical data on one such hybrid bundle – carpet (the 
good) and installation (the service). The results show that for both the installation 
purchase decision and the carpet quantity decision, the price of the installation plays a 
crucial role. Past research on cross-category pricing effects often shows negative cross-
price elasticities smaller than .10 percent. However, the cross-price effect of installation 
on carpet quantity was much higher, with a cross-price elasticity larger than the direct-
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price elasticity. The results suggest it is crucial for marketers of such hybrid bundles to 
effectively price the service. 
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CHAPTER V 
SUMMARY 
 
The three essays in my dissertation examine the different facets of hybrid bundle 
pricing as shown previously in Figure 1-1. Although hybrid bundles are here to stay and 
continue to grow, research on hybrid bundles is scarce. In this dissertation, I provide 
important and useful insights into the pricing of hybrid bundles using a variety of 
methods. 
Using an analytic model of hybrid bundle pricing by a monopolist, Essay I shows 
the considerable effects of quality variability and scalability, while accounting for 
independence and complementarity of the components. My results show that an increase 
(decrease) in quality variability for the service (good) is generally associated with higher 
(lower) optimal prices for the hybrid bundle and lower optimal price for the good, but 
lower (higher) overall firm profits. When marketers of hybrid bundles with high 
variability in the quality of the service, they should consider pricing the service and the 
hybrid bundle relatively higher, while pricing the good relatively lower. The results also 
reveal that the optimal service (good) price in a hybrid bundle is higher (lower) when the 
good has a diminishing unit cost and the service has a constant unit cost (i.e., the good is 
more scalable than the service). These findings have important implications for 
managers of hybrid bundles While increased scalability of the good should naturally lead 
to lower prices for the good and the hybrid bundle, marketers of hybrid bundles should 
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also consider increasing the price of the service if it is available independently from the 
good. 
Using CBC experimental analysis across three studies, Essay II tests the effects 
of quality variability, independence, and complementarity on price sensitivity through 
willingness-to-pay measures and hierarchical Bayesian estimation. The results show that 
higher quality variability of a service within a hybrid bundle is associated with a wider 
distribution of willingness-to-pay, independence between the good and the service in the 
bundle has positive direct- and cross-effects on willingness-to-pay, complementarity 
between the good and the service has a greater positive effect on the willingness-to-pay 
for the service than for the good, and independence and complementarity interact to 
increase willingness-to-pay. The results also offer important guidelines for managers. As 
in Essay I, managers should consider higher relative service prices for hybrid bundles 
with services high in quality variability. In addition, the cross-effects of independence on 
willingness-to-pay highlights that managers of hybrid bundles should strive for 
components that are independent of the other component in usage. 
Through an empirical analysis of prices of hybrid bundles of a large specialty 
retailer data set, Essay III models the direct- and cross-effects of component prices on 
demand for the components in a hybrid bundle offered in a competitive setting. The 
empirical analysis uses data set of approximately 3,700 household transactions involving 
the purchase of a hybrid bundle comprised of carpet (the good) and installation (the 
service). The results show that for both the installation purchase decision and the carpet 
quantity decision, the price of the installation plays a crucial role. Past research on cross-
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category pricing effects often shows very small cross-price elasticities However, the 
cross-price effect of installation on carpet quantity was much higher, with a cross-price 
elasticity larger than the direct-price elasticity. The results suggest it is crucial for 
marketers of such hybrid bundles to effectively price the service. 
Many interesting observations permeate the three essays collectively. First, Essay 
II showed how quality variability affects the willingness-to-pay for the service, while 
Essay I showed that it is optimal for a monopolist to increase the price of the service if 
its quality variability increases. Next, the independence of purchase, as used in Essay I, 
is much different that the independence of use, as used in Essay II, which leads to 
different implications across the two essays. Finally, all three essays showed that either a 
pricing driver or the price of one component can have significant effects on the other 
component. Essay I showed that service quality variability affects the optimal price of 
the good, and that the scalability of the good affects the optimal price of the service. 
Essay II showed that the independence of the good (service) affects consumer 
willingness-to-pay for the service (good). Essay III showed that the cross-elasticity of 
installation price on carpet demand is higher than own-elasticity of carpet price. 
Together, these three essays make important contributions to theoretical modeling of and 
substantive insights on the pricing of hybrid bundles and their component goods and 
services.  
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APPENDIX I 
DERIVATION OF CLOSED-FORM SOLUTION FOR OPTIMAL PRICE 
OF HYBRID BUNDLE UNDER NO INDEPENDENCE 
 
With no independence, the monopolist sells only the hybrid bundle, serving only the 
    segment.  The size of this segment is given by: 
                             (A1.1) 
Assuming a constant unit cost function for both the good and the service, the 
monopolist‘s problem can be defined as: 
     
   
                   . (A1.2) 
I draw reservation prices,       , from the joint uniform distribution such that 
                     for        and         . (A1.3) 
I now derive the optimal price of the hybrid bundle in three cases. 
Case 1:  
   
   
     
 
The size of     is given by: 
        
                                
 
              
 . (A1.4) 
The monopolist‘s problem is given by: 
     
   
                 
                                
 
              
  (A1.5) 
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First Order Condition (simplified): 
  
  
    
   
 
                            
    
                           
 
              
 (A1.6) 
Second Order Condition (simplified): 
  
   
    
  
                   
             
   (A1.7) 
Solving for    : 
     
  
 
 
 
              
 
         
                    
              
 
 
 
 
   (A1.8) 
This solution holds for ―low costs‖: 
  
     
   
 
       
       
  and   
  
  
 (A1.9) 
Case 2:      
   
   
     
 
The size of     is given by: 
        
            
       
 . (A1.10) 
The monopolist‘s problem is given by: 
     
   
                 
            
       
  (A1.11) 
First Order Condition (simplified): 
  
  
    
   
                     
       
 (A1.12) 
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Second Order Condition (simplified): 
  
   
    
  
  
      
   (A1.13) 
Solving for    : 
     
  
                
 
 (A1.14) 
This solution holds for ―medium costs‖: 
  
      
 
 
     
   
 
       
       
  and   
 
 
 (A1.15) 
Case 3:  
   
   
     
 
The size of     is given by: 
        
                                 
 
              
 . (A1.16) 
The monopolist‘s problem is given by: 
     
   
   
              
                                 
 
              
  (A1.17) 
First Order Condition (simplified): 
  
  
    
   
 
                                 
 
                               
 
              
 (A1.18) 
Second Order Condition (simplified): 
  
   
    
   
                           
             
   (A1.19) 
  
131 
 
Solving for    : 
     
  
                    
 
 (A1.20) 
This solution holds for ―high costs‖: 
  
     
   
 
      
 
  and   
 
 
 (A1.21) 
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